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Accusations of corporate and securities fraud dominated headlines over the last decade. Corporate 
wrongdoing damages investor confidence, hurts shareholder value, causes misallocation of capital, and 
increases financial market instability, 1 leading a number of scholars to examine factors affecting the 
likelihood of fraud and its detection. Largely absent from these inquiries, however, is the role played by 
the CEO’s connections with other corporate leaders.2  CEOs have substantial “soft” influence along with 
explicit legal authority within the firm to direct corporate behavior,3 of which wrongdoing is but one 
potential outcome. The “soft” influence is likely to be strengthened by the CEO’s internal connections.  
CEO connections with other top executives and directors could increase or decrease the incidence 
of corporate fraud. As with other corporate activities, corporate wrongdoing often requires coordination 
between, or acquiescence by, top executives and/or board members. The coordination and acquiescence 
can be in the form of direct involvement in criminal activities or a reluctance to “blow the whistle.” 
CEOs’ close connections may help obtain the necessary support and thereby facilitate wrongdoing. 
However, it may also help deter frauds. The CEO’s familiarity with other top executives may enable him 
to detect early signs of fraud. Or when a CEO is unaware or uncertain about the illegality of certain 
activity, a common problem in some areas of white collar crime, closer interpersonal relationships could 
make it easier for other executives and board members to provide friendly information to the CEO to help 
avoid wrongdoing. Further, the CEO’s close connectedness could make it easier to stamp out fraud from 
                                                 
1 See Karpoff and Lott (1993); Beatty, Bunsis, and Hand (1998); Bhagat, Bizjak, and Coles (1998); Karpoff, Lee, and Vendrzyk 
(1999); Bar-Gill and Bebchuk (2002); Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008a); Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2008b); Gande and Lewis 
(2009); Murphy, Shrieves, and Tibbs (2009); and Karpoff, Lee, and Martin (2010).   
2 A notable exception is Chidambaran, Kedia, and Prabhala (2012), who study how CEO-board network ties are related to fraud 
likelihood. 
3 Evidence on the importance of CEO influence on firm behavior and performance includes Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) 
who show CEOs’ behavioral traits such as optimism, risk-aversion, and time preference are related to corporate financial policies 
and managerial compensation; Bertrand and Shoar (2003) who find CEO characteristics matter for a wide range of firm policies; 
Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2006) who document that CEO deaths are strongly negatively correlated with firm 
profitability and growth; Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker (2012) who show differences in corporate financial leverage can be 
traced to CEOs’ personal leverage; and Jenter and Lewellen (2011) who find CEO age approaching retirement has an important 
impact on the likelihood of their firms being taken over and the takeover premiums their shareholders receive. See Allen, 
Kraakman, and Subramanian (2012) for discussion of CEOs’ legal authority to contractually bind the firm for ordinary 
transactions. 
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which the CEO does not anticipate personal gains. That is, CEO connectedness can cut both ways, and 
which effect prevails is an empirical question.    
We consider two sources of CEO connectedness to top executives and directors: appointment 
decisions and prior network ties. We also examine CEO power because the power relationship with other 
corporate leaders may also influence fraud. Of these three possible sources of connections and influence, we 
find the one warranting particular attention for fraud prevention and detection is the least obvious – the 
fraction of top corporate leaders appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. It has strikingly strong effects 
on all aspects of fraud, regardless of whether the connection is built through appointments of top executives 
or directors. In contrast, network ties and CEO power have considerably weaker effects on fraud.   
Appointment-based CEO connectedness is significantly associated with not only greater fraud 
likelihood, but also with lower expected costs of engaging in fraud: it decreases the likelihood of fraud 
detection, lengthens the time from fraud commission to its detection, reduces the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover upon discovery of fraud, and lowers the coordination costs needed to carry out illegal activities. 
Moreover, except for audit committee independence, we find little evidence that other standard monitoring 
mechanisms ameliorate the impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness. 
Connectedness built through appointment decisions increases what social psychologists refer to as 
social influence.  It relies on norms of reciprocity, liking, and social consensus to shape group decision-
making processes (Cialdini, 1984) and, hence, facilitates the acquiescence or coordination required to 
engage in fraud and keep it from view. When more top executives are appointed during a CEO’s tenure, the 
CEO’s social influence increases because CEOs are heavily involved in recruiting, nominating, and 
appointing top executives and in deciding their compensation. Thus, top executives are more likely to share 
similar beliefs and visions with, and may be beholden to, the CEO who hired or promoted them to current 
positions than executives appointed during a previous CEO’s tenure (Landier, Sauvagnat, Sraer, and 
Thesmar, 2013; Kim and Lu, 2013). CEOs also tend to be involved in recruiting board members either 
directly or indirectly through consultation with the nominating committee; thus, directors recruited during a 
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CEO’s tenure may similarly be beholden to the CEO (Morse, Nanda, and Seru, 2011; Coles, Daniel, and 
Naveen, 2011).   
We find CEOs’ prior network connections with top executives and directors do not facilitate fraud 
as effectively as appointment-based connections. CEOs’ prior network ties with top executives are mostly 
unrelated to fraud, and no CEO-board network ties are significantly related to the likelihood of detection. 
On the likelihood of fraud incidence, we find the same mixed effects identified in Chidambaran et al. 
(2012): Fraud probability decreases with professional connections through past employment overlaps but 
increases with nonprofessional social ties. We argue appointment-based connections have stronger effects 
on fraud than network ties because when one is appointed to a top executive position or recommended to 
the board by a CEO, she may feel a greater sense of loyalty to the CEO. Such a loyalty factor is likely to be 
weaker when the connection is through network ties. One may even argue sharing similar education or work 
experiences can breed a sense of competition that may not fit as comfortably with loyalty.  
Our measure of CEO power follows the approaches used in previous studies: Whether the CEO 
chairs the board, is a founder, owns a large number of shares, and/or has served for a long time as CEO. 
These power variables, or their composite index, are mostly unrelated to fraud. CEO power is about the 
ability to exert one’s own will on others – a mostly one-way influence that is easier to resist if the intended 
action or inaction is against the law (i.e., wrongdoing). It does not necessarily reflect the ability to 
encourage voluntary cooperative behavior among a group of individuals, which is often needed for fraud. 
Social influence arising from appointment-based connectedness, by contrast, is about two-way relationships 
conducive to voluntary cooperative behavior, including fraud. 
Our sample covers 17,797 firm-year observations associated with 2,736 unique firms during the 
period 1996 through 2006. We gather comprehensive data on alleged corporate frauds and apply carefully 
designed screens to exclude mistaken or frivolous suits. We identify 315 fraud cases with 886 firm-year 
fraud observations, in which the CEO is a named respondent and data is available to construct 
appointment-based CEO connectedness variables. Our primary source of fraud data is the Federal 
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Securities Regulation (FSR) database (Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin, 2012) generously provided by 
Karpoff and Martin. FSR provides the most comprehensive and accurate data on financial misstatements. 
We include other types of fraud by supplementing FSR with fraud allegations contained in the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s (SEC’s) Litigation Releases and in the Stanford Securities Class Action 
Clearinghouse (SSCAC).   
Inherent in any fraud sample is the partial observability problem: we observe detected frauds, not 
the population of frauds. Since observed fraud depends on two distinct but latent processes--commitment 
of fraud and detection of fraud--we follow Wang, Winton, and Yu (2010) and Wang (2011) and employ 
the bivariate probit model. We measure CEO connectedness with top executives by the fraction of the top 
four non-CEO executives appointed (FTA) during the current CEO’s tenure; CEO connectedness with 
directors, by the fraction of directors appointed (FDA) during a CEO’s tenure. These fractions at a 
particular point in time depend on how long the CEO has been in the office. Thus, our analyses control 
for CEO tenure throughout the paper. For robustness, we also use abnormal fractions of top executives 
and directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure, AFTA and AFDA, which are the residuals of 
regressions relating FTA and FDA to CEO tenure and other factors mechanically correlated to them. 
Both measures of CEO connectedness are positively related to the likelihood of wrongdoing and 
negatively related to the likelihood of detection, given wrongdoing. Our estimates indicate that a firm 
with all four top non-CEO executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FTA = 1) has a 29.65% higher 
fraud incidence and a 27.68% lower likelihood of detection given fraud than a firm with none of the top 
four executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FTA = 0). A firm with all directors appointed during 
the CEO’s tenure (FDA = 1) has a 36.11% higher fraud incidence and a 34.09% lower likelihood of 
detection than a firm with no directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FDA = 0). 
An important factor in the choice of whether or not to commit fraud is the expected punishment 
(Becker, 1968). Thus, we also investigate channels through which CEO connectedness affects the 
expected costs of fraud. Closer CEO connectedness may help conceal fraud by influencing others to 
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fabricate or obfuscate internal records, making it harder to detect or prove wrongdoing in court (Arlen and 
Carney, 1992; Khanna, 2003), or by simply pressuring individuals not to reveal instances of wrongdoing 
out of loyalty to the CEO who appointed them. Bivariate probit model estimates reveal FTA and FDA are 
negatively related to detection, given fraud. FTA and FDA also are positively related to fraud detection 
duration, the period from the commencement of fraudulent activity to the detection date, and negatively 
related to the Cox-hazard ratio of fraud detection. Our estimates imply a fraud by a firm with FTA = 1 
will take 235 days longer to be detected than a fraud by a firm with FTA = 0, while a firm with FDA = 1 
will take 331 days longer to be detected than a fraud by a firm with FDA = 0. CEO connectedness seems 
to help conceal frauds and delay their detection.  
CEO connectedness may also reduce the expected cost of fraud by lowering the probability of 
CEO dismissal upon discovery of wrongdoing. Detected frauds do not automatically lead to forced CEO 
turnover. CEOs more connected to their top lieutenants and board members may garner greater support to 
retain their jobs. We find closer CEO connectedness is associated with lower forced CEO turnover-fraud 
sensitivity. Our estimates indicate that the probability of forced CEO turnover following a fraud by a firm 
with FTA = 1 is 33.85% lower than that by a firm with FTA = 0, while the turnover probability is 47.54% 
lower for a firm with FDA = 1 than for a firm with FDA = 0. 
In addition, coordinating illegal activities may be less costly when CEOs are more closely 
connected with other corporate leaders, as they might be more willing to override internal control 
mechanisms or push through policies or activities that others may be reluctant to pursue (Khanna, 2003). 
With lower coordination costs, more people are likely to be involved in a fraud, and charged when 
detected. This is what we find; the number of people charged with fraud is positively and significantly 
related to both FTA and FDA.  
Since FTA and FDA are endogenous, we estimate two-stage instrumental variable (IV) 
regressions. Our IVs are the death of the CEO, top executives, and directors, and an indicator of whether a 
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firm’s headquarters is located in a remote area. 4  Deaths of the CEO, top executives, and directors 
automatically change FTA and FDA, but our selection criteria of deaths make them unlikely to be related 
to fraud. Executives in remote headquarters may turnover more due to their tendency to prefer larger 
cities, leading to higher FTA, but remoteness is unlikely to be directly related to fraud. The results are 
robust to two-stage estimations using these IVs. Our results are also robust to alternative bivariate probit 
model specifications, alternate measures of FTA and FDA, and an alternative fraud sample construction. 
We then ask whether the adverse effects of CEO connectedness can be contained by standard 
governance mechanisms. We re-estimate the bivariate probit model while interacting FTA or FDA with 
the strength of internal monitoring by the board and the audit committee and with a proxy for external 
monitoring (institutional ownership concentration). Except for audit committee independence, these 
mechanisms do not seem effective in reducing the influence of CEO connectedness on wrongdoing. 
The prior literature on corporate fraud examines the impact of board structure,5 general business 
conditions, 6  corporate lobbying, 7  market- and regulatory-based institutions, 8  and executive 
compensation.9  We contribute to this literature by identifying an important factor magnifying the risk of 
corporate frauds – appointment-based CEO connectedness. Our study also helps us understand how 
different aspects of CEO influence affect fraud. Of three possible sources of CEO influence, the one with 
the most visible effects on fraud is the least noticeable; social influence enhanced through appointment 
decisions rather than prior network ties or CEO power.  
Before detailing our analyses, a caveat is in order: Our findings do not necessarily imply 
appointment-based CEO connectedness is bad overall. It has many potential benefits. For example, 
closely-knit top executives may expedite decision-making and implementation through more effective 
communication and coordination, resulting in better anticipation of, and reactions to, internal and external 
                                                 
4 We thank an anonymous associate editor for suggesting the geographic remoteness as an IV.   
5 See Beasley (1996), Agrawal and Chadha (2005), and Chidambaran et al. (2012). 
6 See Povel, Singh, and Winton (2007); Wang et al. (2010); and Wang and Winton (2012). 
7 See Yu and Yu (2011). 
8 See Dyck, Morse, and Zingales (2010). 
9 See Burns and Kedia (2006); Peng and Röell (2008); Hertzberg (2005); and Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007). 
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challenges. Furthermore, greater FTA and FDA mean there are more newly-appointed top executives and 
directors. The new blood may help revitalize the top executive team and the board, enhancing the CEO’s 
productivity itself (Edmans, Goldstein, and Zhu, 2013). Unfortunately, these efficiency-related benefits of 
appointment-based CEO connectedness are not illuminated here because our inquiry is about a dark side 
of CEO connectedness – its association with fraud. 
The next section contains the empirical design, data description, and summary statistics. Section 
III provides the main results. The channels through which CEO connectedness influences the expected 
cost of wrongdoing are explored in Section IV. Section V conducts additional robustness tests. Section VI 
investigates whether standard monitoring mechanisms ameliorate the impact of CEO connectedness. 
Section VII examines pre-existing network ties and CEO power. Section VIII concludes. 
II. EMPIRICAL DESIGN, DATA, AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
II.1 Empirical Methodology 
To address the partial observability issue when estimating the relation between CEO 
connectedness and fraud, we follow Wang et al. (2010) and Wang (2011) and employ the bivariate probit 
model. For each firm i, we denote Fraudit*and Detectit*as the latent variables determining firm i’s 
likelihood of committing a fraud in year t and the possibility of detecting it as follows: 
Fraudit* = XF,itδ + μit                                                                        (1a) 
Detectit* = XD,itη + νit                                             (1b) 
XF,it is a vector of variables explaining firm i’s likelihood of committing a fraud in year t, and XD,it 
contains variables explaining the firm’s likelihood of being detected. μit and νit are zero-mean disturbances 
with a bivariate normal distribution. The correlation between μit and νit is ρ. We define Fraudit = 1, if 
Fraudit* > 0, and Fraudit = 0, otherwise; and Detectit = 1 if Detectit* > 0, and Detectit  = 0, otherwise. We 
do not directly observe the realizations of Fraudit  and Detectit; instead, we observe Observeit  =  
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FrauditDetectit, where Observeit = 1 if firm i has committed fraud and has been detected, and Observeit = 0 
if firm i has not committed a fraud or has committed fraud but has not been detected.  
Let Ф denote the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function. The empirical model 
for Observeit is: 
P(Observeit  = 1) = P(FrauditDetectit  = 1) = Ф(XF,itδ, XD,itη, ρ)                      (2a) 
P(Observeit  = 0) = P(FrauditDetectit  = 0) = 1 - Ф(XF,itδ, XD,itη, ρ)                 (2b) 
Thus, the log-likelihood function for the model is: 
L(δ, η,  ρ) = Σ log(P(Observeit = 1)) + Σ log(P(Observeit  = 0))                     (3) 
This model can be estimated using the maximum-likelihood method.  
An important assumption of the bivariate probit model is that XF,it and XD,it do not contain the 
same set of variables such that at least one vector has one or more variables absent in the other vector.  
This condition is satisfied in our study because some variables affect fraud incidence directly without 
appreciably affecting the likelihood of detection, yielding variables in XF,it that are not present in XD,it. 
Prior studies indicate that the groups responsible for detecting most securities fraud (such as the SEC, 
employees, and the media; see Dyck et al., 2010) rarely use most of the variables influencing fraud 
commitment in their detection efforts (Cox, Kiku, and Thomas, 2003; Bowen, Call, and Rajgopal, 2010).   
To account for possible correlations among firms in the same industry, robust standard errors are 
clustered at the industry level (the Fama-French (1997) 48 industry groupings.) We also cluster standard 
errors at the firm and the CEO-firm level. The results, reported in the Appendix 1, Panel D, are robust.  
II.2. Variables 
  II.2.1. Fraud  
Our primary source of fraud data is the Federal Securities Regulation (FSR) database described in 
Karpoff et al. (2012), who carefully study Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department 
of Justice (DOJ) publications and compile an exhaustive list of Federal enforcement actions under Section 
13(b). Because sometimes there are multiple enforcement actions for a single instance of an alleged 
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Section 13(b) violation, they group these actions together so that only one case is identified. For each case, 
FSR provides detailed relevant information.  
The SEC also brings other enforcement actions that go beyond the section 13(b) violations 
covered by FSR. Thus, we supplement FSR with alleged fraud cases from the SEC’s online Litigation 
Releases (http://www.sec.gov/litigation.shtml), which contain information on civil lawsuits and 
administrative proceedings brought by the SEC for alleged financial misreporting, insider trading, 
violations of the Foreign Corruption Practice Act, violations of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and other alleged 
violations of the Federal Securities Laws and accompanying regulations.   
Shareholders may also bring private civil suits, independently of the SEC, for infractions beyond 
those covered in FSR.  Thus, we supplement FSR and SEC with data from the Stanford Securities Class 
Action Clearinghouse (SSCAC) (http://securities.stanford.edu/index.html), which provides information 
on private securities fraud class actions. It provides a collection of likely discovered fraud cases, 
including virtually all alleged frauds with more than a de minimis effect on stock price that could generate 
private litigation.10  However, such private suits might include frivolous suits, because private litigants 
may be using the costs of the legal system as means to extract a monetary settlement (Alexander, 1991; 
Grundfest, 1995; Choi, 2007; Choi et al., 2009; Dyck et al., 2010). This raises a concern about false 
detections, which motivated Dyck et al. (2010) to apply careful screening procedures to exclude suits that 
could potentially be mistaken or frivolous. In particular, they exclude (i) cases that were subsequently 
dismissed by a court and (ii) settled cases where the settlement amounts are less than $3 million.11 These 
screens are the standard treatment in the securities fraud literature when addressing the concern of over-
inclusion and we also rely on them to screen cases from SSCAC. However, unlike Dyck et al., we do not 
exclude backdating cases, IPO underwriter allocation cases, mutual fund timing and late trading cases, 
                                                 
10 Filing a securities class action lawsuit is now a largely automated process whereby law firms file a suit whenever there is a 
negative stock price movement above a certain de minimis level (Choi, Nelson, and Pritchard, 2009). 
11 The threshold of $3 million originates from previous studies (Grundfest, 1995; Choi, 2007; and Choi et al., 2009), which 
suggest a settlement amount as an indicator to separate frivolous suits from meritorious ones. They find suits settling below a 
$2.5 - $1.5 million threshold are on average frivolous. The range reflects the cost to the law firm for its effort in filing. A firm 
settling for less than $1.5 million is almost certainly just paying lawyer fees to avoid negative court exposure. 
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analyst cases involving false provision of favorable coverage, or cases where defendants claim they are 
settling to avoid negative publicity if the settlement amount exceeds $3 million.   
For cases from FSR and the SEC’s website, we do not screen cases settled for amounts less than 
$3 million. SEC enforcement actions are less likely to be frivolous or mistaken than private suits because 
the people making enforcement decisions (the SEC’s employees) do not directly receive the monetary 
remedies (as a private litigant might). Thus, a small settlement amount in a SEC case does not imply a 
frivolous suit; instead, perhaps the SEC pursued a case involving a small damage because the case raised 
important legal or enforcement questions or perhaps the SEC demanded a substantial change in financial 
reporting and/or improvement in corporate governance in lieu of a large settlement.  We do, however, 
exclude suits in FSR and SEC dismissed by the courts. 
Our sample period runs from 1996 to 2009. (We started compiling data in 2010.) RiskMetrics 
provides board data starting in 1996. This is also the first year after the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act 1995, which was designed to reduce frivolous private securities fraud class actions. 
Although our sample period ends in 2009, the fraud sample includes only frauds occurring no later than 
2006 to allow inclusion of frauds that took place during the sample period but were detected between 
2007 and 2009. This reduces bias due to late detection. In our sample, the average duration from the 
commencement of fraudulent activity to the detection date is 1,073 days. For firms with multiple 
securities lawsuits, we use the one involving the most number of people charged in the litigation.  
Because our inquiry is about the role CEO connectedness plays in fraud, we exclude cases in 
which the CEO is not a named respondent. Although not being named does not necessarily mean the CEO 
was uninvolved, CEO culpability is less likely. These screening criteria yield 315 unique fraud cases with 
886 fraud firm-year observations that contain sufficient data to construct our measures of appointment-
based CEO connectedness. We also identify 62 unique fraud cases in which the CEO is unnamed. For 
completeness, we add the CEO-unnamed cases to our fraud sample and re-estimate all key regressions in 
Appendix 6.  
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 II.2.2. Appointment-based CEO connectedness 
 Our measures of CEO connectedness are the fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed, 
FTAit; 12 and the fraction of directors appointed, FDAit, during the tenure of firm i’s CEO as of year t. We 
follow ExecuComp and rank executives by the sum of salaries and bonuses. In calculating FDA, we exclude 
the CEO from both the numerator and denominator if he is on the board. We determine if the executive or 
the director is appointed during the current CEO’s tenure by comparing the appointment year with the year 
the current CEO took office.13 We assume the year a non-CEO executive first appears on the list of top four 
non-CEO executives is the year in which she secured the position. The appointment date of each board 
member is obtained from RiskMetrics. Although RiskMetrics data is available from 1996, information on 
directors’ appointment dates is available only from 1998, therefore the sample period for FDA analyses 
starts in 1998 instead of 1996.  
We also regress FTA and FDA on CEO tenure and other factors and use the residuals as abnormal 
FTA and FDA. The re-estimation results using the abnormal measures, reported in Appendix 2, are robust. 
II.2.3. Control variables 
 Estimating the bivariate probit model requires two sets of control variables, one each for the fraud 
commission and detection equations. They may overlap, but should not be identical. In the baseline model, 
all variables in the detection equation are included in the commission equation, because the expected cost 
of committing fraud depends on the probability of detection. However, the commission equation contains 
additional variables, which do not appear in the detection equation. Factors affecting fraud commission 
may not have obvious implications for the likelihood of detection, because the parties responsible for 
detection are unlikely to rely on all factors. For frauds in FSR and SEC Litigation Releases, the primary 
                                                 
12 Landier et al. (2013) use an FTA based on new hires only. We include all top executives added to the list of top four non-CEO 
executives because similar connections may arise through promotion within the firm and/or compensation increases. We also 
drop firm-year observations when ExecuComp reports less than five top executives (including CEO) to reduce noise in FTAit. 
Kim and Lu (2011) illustrate the importance of keeping constant the number of executives when constructing executive variables. 
Cross-checking against proxy statements shows that missing executives in ExecuComp are due to omission: The firm-year 
observations with less than five top executives in ExecuComp show five or more top executives in proxy statements. 
13 When the appointment year of the current CEO and an executive or a director is the same, as in Morse et al. (2011), we do not 
include the executive or director in calculating FTA or FDA because we cannot determine who is appointed first. 
 12 
detector is the SEC.14 Prior studies show that the SEC does not rely on the fraud incidence variables 
identified by prior literature in motivating their detection efforts, but rather on financial distress (Cox et 
al., 2003; Bowen et al., 2010). For frauds in SSCAC the primary detectors are employees, the media and 
other regulatory bodies (Dyck et al., 2010). The detectors are highly unlikely to rely on all the variables 
we include in the commission equation. It is also possible that individuals considering engaging in 
wrongdoing may not fully appreciate all the factors influencing fraud detection; hence, we allow some 
control variables in the detection equation to be omitted from the commission equation and report the 
estimation results in Appendix 1, Panel A. The results are robust.  
• Fraud Detection 
Internal and external monitoring may play an important role in detecting fraud. Control variables 
related to internal monitoring by the board include: (1) the percentage of non-independent directors on the 
board, %_NonIndepDirectors. The monitoring role played by independent directors has been widely 
documented; for example, Weisbach (1988) finds CEO turnover following poor performance is positively 
related to the fraction of outside directors. (2) Log of the number of directors on the board, Ln(BoardSize). 
Prior research indicates larger boards tend to be less effective monitors (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 
1993; Yermack, 1996; and Eisenberg, Sundren, and Wells, 1998). (3) Log of the number of board 
meetings in a given year, Ln(BoardMeetings), which may indicate the strength of board oversight and 
monitoring (Vafeas, 1999). (4) The percentage of non-independent directors on the audit 
committee, %_NonIndepDirectors_Audit, and (5) the log of the number of directors on the audit 
committee, Ln(AuditComSize). Audit committees, charged with the oversight of financial reporting, 
internal controls, and external audits, play an important role in fraud detection (Deli and Gillan, 2000).  
The strength of external monitoring is proxied by institutional ownership concentration (IOC) and 
analyst coverage (Ln(Analyst)). Previous studies document the important roles institutional investors play 
                                                 
14 The other primary enforcer, the Department of Justice, often relies on information provided by the SEC (Garrett, 2011; 
Khanna, 1996) 
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in shaping corporate governance (e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003; Cremers and Nair, 2005; Del Guercio, 
Seery, and Woidtke, 2008; Edmans, 2009; and Kim and Lu, 2011). We follow Hartzell and Starks (2003) 
and estimate IOC by the percentage shareholdings of the top five institutional investors. Analyst coverage 
is widely considered an important form of external monitoring as it reduces information asymmetry (e.g., 
Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000; Brav and Lehavy, 2003; Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary, 2006; Das, Guo, and 
Zhang, 2006; and Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012). Ln(Analyst) is the logged value of one plus the number of 
analysts following a firm in a given year.  
The securities litigation literature (e.g., Jones and Weingram, 1996; Johnson, Nelson, and 
Pritchard, 2007) suggests that firm performance and stock return volatility are related to a firm’s litigation 
risk. Firm performance is proxied by Tobin’s Q and Ebitda/TA. Tobin’s Q is measured as the ratio of the 
market value of common equity plus the book value of total liabilities to the book value of total assets. 
Ebitda/TA is measured as earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by the 
book value of total assets. Stock return volatility, StockVolatilities, is measured as the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns over a given year. In addition, Wang et al. (2010) find stock turnover is positively 
related to fraud detection because, “High stock turnover implies that more investors are affected by the 
company’s stock price and thus it is easier to identify a class of plaintiff investors” (p.2267). 
StockTurnover is the number of shares traded in a year divided by the number of shares outstanding.  
Litigation intensity can be correlated among firms within an industry, and high industry litigation 
intensity may increase an individual firm’s litigation risk (Wang et al., 2010).  Many firms in an industry 
may adopt similar practices that fall foul of the laws and, perhaps, enforcement authorities learn through 
experience how to detect fraud in particular industries. We control for abnormal industry litigation 
activities with IndustryLitigation, the yearly deviation from the average litigation intensity in an industry. 
The level of litigation intensity in an industry is measured by the number of lawsuits in the FSR, SEC, 
and SSCAC databases against publicly-listed firms in an industry in a given year (prior to application of 
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any litigation screens) divided by the number of firms covered by Compustat in the same industry in the 
same year. When a fraud case is covered by more than one data source, it is counted only once. 
We also control for firm size, sales growth rate, and leverage. Frauds by larger firms (Wang et al., 
2010) and higher growth firms are more likely to be detected because they tend to attract more investor 
attention. Firms with high financial leverage may be more closely monitored by banks and fixed-income 
investors. We measure firm size as the log of the book value of total assets, Ln(TotalAssets); growth rate 
as the three-year annual growth rate in sales as reported in ExecuComp, SalesGrowth_3Yr; and financial 
leverage as the sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets, Leverage.  
Our controls for CEO characteristics include CEO tenure, CEO_Tenure; whether the CEO chairs 
the board, CEO_Chair, or is a founder, CEO_Founder; CEO share ownership, CEO_OWN and 
CEO_OWN2; and the log of CEO age, Ln(CEO_Age). We control for CEO tenure because FTA and FDA 
are related to the current CEO’s tenure and a CEO with longer tenure may have more influence. CEOs 
chairing the board may be more powerful, making it easier to weaken the intensity of internal and external 
monitoring. A founder CEO may be more knowledgeable about the organization and more powerful. A 
CEO is considered a founder if he was the CEO five years prior to going public, where the date of going 
public is assumed to be the first date the firm appears in the CRSP database (Bebchuk, Cremer, and Peyer, 
2011). CEO share ownership may affect the incidence of frauds by influencing firm performance and risk 
taking. We include CEO_OWN2 because Kim and Lu (2011) show CEO_OWN is related to firm 
performance and risk-taking in a hump shaped fashion. CEO age is added because older CEOs tend to be 
more experienced and cautious. 
• Fraud Incidence 
The likelihood of fraud occurring is influenced by (1) variables that affect detection because the 
likelihood of detection affects the expected costs of committing fraud, and (2) variables that have their 
own direct influence on the incentives to engage in fraud regardless of whether they also affect detection. 
For example, Tobin’s Q and Ebitda/TA, which are included in the detection equation, may also be directly 
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related to fraud incidence, as fraud is more likely when a firm is suffering operating troubles (Arlen and 
Carney 1992; Alexander and Cohen, 1999). Higher leverage may increase fraud incidence by providing 
the incentive for firms to inflate reported earnings and other accounting measures to avoid violating debt 
covenants. Career concerns may discourage younger CEOs from committing frauds. Founder CEOs are 
more venturesome, a characteristic that may be extended to activities of uncertain legality.  
Besides these factors, other variables may directly affect the likelihood of committing frauds 
without an obvious influence on detection. Wang et al. (2010) argue the incidence of fraud is related to 
investor beliefs about industry prospects and provide evidence of a hump-shaped relation with industry 
Tobin’s Q. Product market competition may also affect fraud incidence by reducing managerial slack and 
strengthening governance (Guadalupe and Wulf, 2010; Giroud and Mueller, 2010, 2011; Kim and Lu, 
2011).  Competition is measured by industry concentration ratio (ICR), which is the sum of the market 
share of the four biggest firms in sales among all firms in Compustat in the same industry in a given 
year.15 A lower ratio indicates greater competition.  
We include Industry Q, (Industry Q)2, and ICR in the fraud commission equation, but following 
Wang et al. (2010), Industry Q and (Industry Q)2 are excluded from the detection equation. We also 
exclude ICR from the detection equation. 16  There is little reason to believe these factors affect the 
likelihood of detection because the likely enforcers, such as the SEC, do not seem to rely on these factors 
in their detection efforts (Cox et al., 2003; Bowen at al., 2010). Table I describes all key variables. 
II.3. Sample Construction  
CEO and executive data are taken from ExecuComp; board information, from RiskMetrics; firm 
characteristics and accounting data, from Compustat; stock return and trading data, from CRSP; analyst 
                                                 
15 The Economic Census uses the largest 4, 8, 20, or 50 companies to compute ICRs. Because Compustat covers only public 
firms, we rely on the four largest companies to minimize the possibility of excluding private firms. 
16 Wang and Winton (2012) argue industry competition is related to the amount of information collection about individual firms, 
which may affect fraud detection. We re-estimate the bivariate probit model while including the ICR in both the detection and the 
commission equations. The results, reported in Appendix 1, Panel B, are robust. We do not include ICR in the detection 
regression because the detection equation already contains a number of variables correlated with the amount of information about 
individual firms – the number of financial analysts, stock turnover, institutional investor concentration, and stock volatility.      
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coverage data, from I/B/E/S from Thomson Reuters; and institutional ownership data, from the CDA 
Spectrum database. Merging these databases with fraud data provides a large panel dataset from 1996 
through 2006.  
Table II reports the sample distribution of all firms with data available to construct FTA or FDA 
and of firms with identified fraud. Panel A shows the sample distribution by year. The total number of 
sample firms is relatively stable over time, while the number of firms with frauds varies considerably. In 
the first few observation years, fraud firms are small both in number and percentage, but they increase as 
the year progresses. The peak is 2001, a year with an unusually large number of business scandals. The 
year of fraud is defined as the year when fraud took place, not the year of detection. When a fraud lasts 
more than one year, we have multiple firm-year observations associated with that fraud.  
Panel B shows the sample distribution by FTA, FDA, and their abnormal measures. FTA has five 
values because we consider only top-four non-CEO executives, so we separate FTA and FDA into five 
groups by 0.25 increments, and AFTA and AFDA into quintiles. Column (4) shows the percentage of 
firms engaged in wrongdoing decreases initially in FTA but increases from FTA = 0.25. This bi-modal 
pattern is accentuated in its abnormal measure, AFTA, which is separated into quintiles, with the 
percentage of firms with alleged fraud sharply increasing from the middle quintile. FDA shows a similar 
pattern as FTA, but AFDA does not. The number of observations is smaller for FDA than FTA, because 
director appointment date is available only from 1998.  FTA calculation starts in 1996.  
II.4. Summary Statistics 
Table III contains summary statistics for all key variables. The statistics for the full sample are 
reported in Panel A. The mean Fraud is 0.05, indicating fraud observations account for 5% of all firm-
year observations. On average it takes 1073 days (about 3 years) from the commencement of fraudulent 
activity to the fraud detection date. Most frauds in our sample involve accounting related matters (93%), 
while 34% and 42% of frauds involve real business activities and executives taking advantage of their 
positions, respectively. The sum exceeds 100% because a fraud may belong to multiple categories. The 
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mean and median FTA is 0.41 and 0.5, suggesting that at a typical firm-year, about half of the top four 
non-CEO executives are appointees of the current CEO. The mean and median FDA is 0.37 and 0.33, 
indicating that at a typical firm-year, about one-third of directors on the board are appointed during the 
current CEO’s tenure. AFTA and AFDA, the regression residuals, are close to zero. 
Panel B reports the mean of each variable separately for the fraud and non-fraud sample in 
Columns (6) and (7). Columns (8) and (9) show the difference in the means and the P-value of the t-test 
for the difference. The fraud sample shows significantly higher values for most measures of appointment-
based CEO connectedness than the non-fraud sample. (Including alternative proxies used for robustness 
tests, there are 14 different appointment-based CEO connectedness measures.) Control variables show, on 
average, fraud firms are larger and more volatile; have higher Q, lower Ebitda margins, higher leverage, 
higher sales growth rates, greater stock turnovers, more frequent board meetings, larger audit committees, 
more financial analysts, and smaller institutional ownership concentration; belong to industries with 
higher Q and more litigation. Fraud firms also show more founder CEOs, CEOs chairing the board, 
younger CEOs, and CEOs with longer tenure.  
Table IV presents pair-wise correlations between the fraud indicator and FTA and FDA, 
separately for fraud cases in which the CEO is named (Panel A) and unnamed (Panel B). Both CEO 
connection measures are significantly and positively correlated to fraud incidence in CEO-named cases, 
but show no correlation to fraud in CEO-unnamed cases. The table also reports cross-sectional 
correlations of FTA and FDA with the number of days it took to detect a fraud and the number of people 
charged. The difference between CEO-named and CEO-unnamed cases is striking. When the CEO is 
named, all correlations are positive and significant in five out of six. By contrast, when the CEO is 
unnamed, none of the correlations is positive and significant. This difference suggests that appointment-
based CEO connectedness facilitates fraud only when the CEO is considered culpable. 
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III. FRAUD COMMISSION AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION 
III.1. Main Results 
Table V reports the bivariate probit estimation results. The first two columns rely on FTA as the 
measure of CEO connectedness; the next two columns, FDA; and the last two columns, an equally 
weighted combined measure of FTA and FDA, FTA+FDA, which measures CEO connectedness in both 
executive suites and the board room. FTA and FDA may overlap because an executive appointed during a 
CEO’s tenure may also be appointed to the board before the CEO’s tenure ends. In our sample, 16% of 
top four non-CEO executives appointed during the CEO tenure serve on the board. Such overlaps increase 
the CEO’s overall connectedness. Odd numbered columns show the estimation results for the commission 
equation; even numbered columns show the detection equation.  
The coefficients on the variables of main interest, FTA, FDA, and FTA+FDA, show the predicted 
signs and are statistically significant. CEO connectedness with top executives and directors is associated 
with greater fraud incidence and a lower likelihood of detection. The estimated coefficients of FTA 
suggest that a firm with all top four executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FTA = 1) has 29.65% 
higher fraud probability and 27.68% lower likelihood of detection than a firm with no top four executives 
appointed during the CEO tenure (FTA = 0). A firm with all directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure 
(FDA = 1) has 36.11% higher fraud probability and 34.09% lower likelihood of detection than a firm with 
none of the directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FDA = 0).  
Several control variables show significant coefficients. Tobin’s Q, stock turnover, and board size 
are related to fewer fraud incidences and a higher likelihood of detection. Higher growth opportunities, 
the ease of identifying a plaintiff class of investors, and larger boards seem to have preventive effects on 
wrongdoing. Larger firms are associated with a significantly higher likelihood of detection, reflecting the 
greater scrutiny they face. Firms with faster sales growth rates during the past three years show a 
significantly higher likelihood of committing frauds. Some of the past high sales growth rates could be 
the result of misleading sales figures. Surprisingly, less independent boards (%_NonIndepDirectors) are 
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associated with a lower incidence of fraud and a higher likelihood of detection. Prior studies show no 
correlation between board independence and the likelihood of accounting fraud (Beasley, 1996; Agrawal 
and Chadha, 2005). 
The three variables excluded from the detection equation show insignificant coefficients. 
However, the signs of coefficients on Industry Q and (Industry Q)2 in Columns (1) and (3) are consistent 
with Wang et al. (2010), who show the incidence of fraud is related to industry Q in a hump-shaped 
fashion. The coefficients on the three variables are insignificant because of their high correlations. 
Industry Q is not only highly correlated with (Industry Q)2, but is also significantly correlated to ICR 
(correlation = - 0.1507, significant at 1% level). An F-test on the joint significance of Industry Q and 
(Industry Q)2 (F-stats = 6.84 and Prob > Chi2 = 0.0327) indicates they are jointly significant. The joint test 
for Industry Q, (Industry Q)2, and ICR, yields F-stat = 8.09 and Prob > Chi2 = 0.0442. 
Coefficients on variables related to CEO power, CEO-chair, CEO share ownership, CEO tenure, 
and founder-CEOs, are mostly insignificant. It appears CEO power per se has rather insignificant effects 
on wrongdoing or its detection. We investigate this issue further in Section VII.2. 
III.2. Instrumental Variables Regressions 
 Because FTA and FDA are endogenous, their relations with fraud incidence or detection may not 
be causal. To infer causality, we construct instrumental variables (IVs) related to FTA and FDA that are 
unlikely to be directly related to wrongdoing. Our IVs are CEO, top four non-CEO executive, director 
turnovers due to death, and an indicator for headquarters located in a remote area. CEO_Death is an 
indicator equal to one if the previous CEO leaves the position due to death and zero otherwise. It is 
defined over the current CEO’s entire tenure. Exe_Death and Dir_Death are the number of top four non-
CEO executives and directors who left their positions due to death during the current CEO’s tenure up to 
the current year, so they are defined year by year. These deaths automatically change FTA and FDA. To 
check whether the deaths are related to fraud, we search media articles from Factiva on the cause of 
deaths. None can be attributed to suicide. Table III shows, on average, the majority of non-CEO top 
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executives (59%) and directors (63%) are previous CEOs’ appointees, whose turnovers, by definition, 
should lead to higher FTA and FDA.  
Remoteness is equal to one if the population of the county of the firm's headquarters is less than 
100,000, and zero otherwise. County information of headquarters is obtained from Compustat, and the 
population information from the U.S. Census Bureau. Top executives tend to prefer larger metropolitan 
areas (e.g., New York) to remote places, so turnover rates of executives in remote headquarters are likely 
to be higher, leading to more appointments during the current CEO’s tenure – higher FTA. Remoteness 
may also lead to closer social interactions between the CEO and top executives, inducing CEOs to have 
more of their own appointees with whom they feel comfortable. But remoteness is unlikely to be directly 
related to fraud. It also is defined year by year. 
The first-stage estimation results are reported in Table VI. Columns (1) and (5) correspond to the 
fraud commission regressions and, hence, include the IV variables and all control variables used in the 
fraud commission regressions in Table V. Columns (2) and (6) correspond to the fraud detection 
regressions, including the IV variables and all control variables used in detection regressions. When we 
estimate the bivariate model in the second stage, the error terms of the fraud commission and detection 
regressions are allowed to be correlated. As expected, FTA decreases with CEO death and increases with 
both executive death and remoteness. All these relations are significant. FDA is significantly and 
negatively related to CEO death. However, FDA’s relations to director death and remoteness are positive 
but insignificant. The insignificant relations are probably due to the fact that a director vacancy does not 
have to be filled during the same or even later years and that unlike top executives, outside directors often 
do not live near corporate headquarters. F-statistics (IVs), representing an F-test that all the instrumental 
variables are jointly zero, are all well above 10. 
The second-stage estimates show predicted values of FTA and FDA, FTA_Hat and FDA_Hat, are 
positively related to the incidence of fraud and negatively related to detection given fraud. All coefficients 
of the predicted values are significant.  
 21 
IV. EXPECTED COSTS OF COMMITTING FRAUD 
We assume individuals weigh the expected cost of fraud against the expected benefit in deciding 
whether or not to commit fraud. Thus, if CEO connectedness reduces the cost, it will increase the 
incidence of fraud. In this section we investigate three possible channels through which CEO 
connectedness reduces the cost of committing frauds. Because the expected cost depends on penalties for 
wrongdoing and the likelihood of detection, we examine how CEO connectedness affects the likelihood 
of the CEO losing his job when tainted with fraud, an important penalty, and how CEO connectedness 
helps delay or evade detection. We also examine how CEO connectedness is related to the coordination 
costs required for fraudulent activities. We focus on the cost side, as we do not have testable predictions 
on how CEO connectedness affects the benefits of engaging in fraud. 
IV.1. Forced CEO Turnover-Fraud Sensitivity 
When CEOs’ involvement in wrongdoing is detected, they may receive court determined 
penalties, such as civil and criminal penalties (e.g., jail, monetary sanctions); and market determined 
penalties, such as reputational loss and dismissals (Khanna, 1996). Unlike court determined fines or jail 
terms, dismissal of a CEO is largely a firm level decision. The authority to dismiss a CEO belongs to the 
board and, hence, closer connectedness with board members may help a CEO tainted by fraud retain his 
job. The board does not make the decision in isolation, however. It also considers the opinions of other 
top executives and their possible reactions. If, for example, other top executives oppose the dismissal, are 
likely to leave the firm with the CEO, and are highly valued by the board, then the board may be less 
inclined to dismiss the CEO. In this section we relate both FTA and FDA to the likelihood of forced CEO 
turnover given the detection of fraud.  
Forced CEO turnover is identified following the procedure in Parrino (1997) and Jenter and Kanaan 
(2011). If a CEO’s departure is reported by the press as fired, forced out, or retired/resigned due to policy 
differences or pressure, it is classified as forced. All other departures for CEOs who are 60 years of age or 
older are classified as voluntary, unless they resign due to litigation or fraud. All departures for CEOs under 
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60 years of age are evaluated further and are classified as forced if the article does not report the reason as 
death, poor health, or acceptance of another position (including the chairmanship of the board); or if the 
article reports that the CEO is retiring, but does not announce the retirement at least six months before the 
succeeding CEO takes office. Finally, cases classified as forced are reclassified as voluntary if press reports 
convincingly explain the departure is due to previously undisclosed personal or business reasons that are 
unrelated to the firm’s activities.  
The dependent variable is Forced_CEO_Turnoverit, an indicator for forced CEO turnover. We use 
two alternative estimation methods: the OLS with firm- and year-fixed effects in the first three columns in 
Table VII and the firm level conditional logit model controlling for year dummies in the last three columns. 
Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The variable relating a detected fraud to forced CEO 
turnover in year t is Fraud_t-3-t, which is equal to one if fraud takes place anytime during the four-year 
period over year t-3 to year t. We construct this variable based on the commission date rather than the 
detection date, because by the time a fraud is detected the CEO involved in the fraud may already be 
replaced by a new CEO unassociated with the fraud. The four-year period allows time for the fraud to be 
detected and for the firm to decide on the fate of the CEO. The variable of main interest is the interaction of 
Fraud_t-3-t with FTA or FDA. The interaction term measures how CEO connectedness affects the likelihood 
of dismissing a CEO named in a fraud.  
One key control variable is CEO_Jail&Bar, which equals one if a CEO goes to jail and/or is barred 
from serving as CEO of public companies. A barred CEO cannot serve as CEO of a public company and a 
jailed CEO of a public company would, in all likelihood, not retain his position regardless of connectedness. 
Other control variables include firm performance measures such as Q, Ebitda/TA, and SalesGrowth_3Yr; 
firm size, Ln(TotalAssets); external monitoring, IOC and Ln(analysts); product market competition, ICR; 
CEO characteristics, CEO_Founder, CEO_Chair, CEO tenure, and Ln(CEO_Age); board 
charateristics, %_NonIndepDirectors, Ln(BoardMeeting), and Ln(BoardSize); and industry litigation 
intensity, IndustryLitigation. We control for these variables because a CEO tainted by fraud is less likely to 
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be dismissed if the firm performs better, is subject to less external monitoring, has a more powerful CEO, 
and operates in an industry less tainted by litigation. We also control for firm size, board characteristics, and 
industry competition, because they also may influence the dismissal decision. 
The estimation results are reported in Table VII. As expected, the conditional logit estimation 
shows CEO_Jail&Bar is significantly and positively related to the likelihood of forced CEO turnover. 
More important, the interaction of Fraud_t-3-t with FTA, FDA, or FTA+FDA shows significantly negative 
coefficients under both specifications. The estimated coefficients in Column (4) indicate that the 
probability of forced CEO turnover following a fraud is 33.85% lower for a firm with all top four 
executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FTA = 1) than for a firm with none of the top four 
executives appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FTA = 0.)  Column (5) shows the probability of forced 
CEO turnover is 47.54% lower when a firm has FDA = 1 than when FDA = 0. Control variables with 
significant estimated coefficients show signs that are mostly consistent with our expectations.17 
IV.2. Fraud Detection Duration 
 CEO connectedness may also reduce the expected costs of wrongdoing by reducing the likelihood 
of detection. Top executives are often in a position to receive internal information about wrongdoing and 
do something to interdict it (Dyck et al., 2010; Bowen et al., 2010). If the executives owe their current 
positions to the CEO, they might be less enthusiastic about revealing information about wrongdoing or 
may actively help to cover it up. Connected board members may also be less eager to take actions 
required for detection even when they sense something is wrong. Favors can go the other way as well. 
When a connected executive or director commits wrongdoing, the CEO may be more forgiving and “look 
the other way.”   
If connectedness hinders fraud detection, the more connected a CEO, the longer it would take to 
detect a fraud and the lower would be the probability of detection. Thus, we relate CEO connectedness to 
                                                 
17 The control variables indicate that CEOs are subject to greater likelihood of dismissal when they are less connected to top 
executives and directors; institutional ownership concentration is greater; the industry is under greater litigation risk; and the 
CEO is older, a founder, and has a shorter tenure.    
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fraud detection duration, the log of the number of days from the commencement of fraudulent activity to 
its detection date. The estimation is based on cross-sectional data for each fraud case. Independent 
variables are the average FTA, FDA, FTA+FDA, and control variables over each fraud period, defined as 
the beginning to the ending date of fraudulent activities.  
Control variables include the total value of settlement, Tot_Settlement, because of its possible 
correlation with fraud duration. The private attorneys who bring class action suits prefer fraud with longer 
duration because it is likely to increase the settlement amount, in turn increasing their compensation.18 
Longer duration increases the likely number of shareholders who might have traded during the fraud 
thereby increasing the number of plaintiffs. So the attorneys have the incentive to allege that a fraud 
continued for a long time and prefer bringing suits where there is evidence that the fraud has persisted 
longer. The enforcement attorneys at the SEC are not directly motivated by monetary compensation, but 
frauds that have persisted longer are likely to cause more damages and might be instances where the SEC 
considers it worthwhile to expend its scarce enforcement resources. For these reasons, we also control for 
variables that are likely to be related to the expected size of settlement and detection duration, such as the 
stock performance, stock volatility, and stock turnover. The stock performance is measured by the 
average annual buy-and-hold stock return over the fraud period.  
Other controls include Ebitda/TA, firm size, leverage, sales growth rate, industry litigation, the 
number of financial analysts, CEO-chair, CEO-founder, CEO tenure, and CEO share ownership. Data 
requirements reduce the sample to 296 unique fraud cases from the original 315 fraud cases. To avoid 
reducing the sample size any further, we set Tot_Settlement to zero if it is missing and include 
Tot_Settlement_D, a dummy variable equal to one if Tot_Settlement is not missing. We account for 
possible correlations among fraud cases in the same industry by clustering robust standard errors at the 
industry level.  
                                                 
18 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us. 
 25 
Table VIII, Panel A, shows that the number of days frauds remain undetected is positively and 
significantly related to all three measures of CEO connectedness. The estimated coefficients in the 
regression suggest that a fraud conducted by a firm with all top four executives appointed during the 
CEO’s tenure (FTA = 1) will take 235 days longer to be detected than a fraud by a firm with FTA = 0, 
while a firm with all director appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FDA = 1) will take 331 days longer to 
be detected than a fraud by a firm with none of the directors appointed during the CEO’s tenure (FDA = 
0).  In Panel B, the dependent variable is the hazard ratio for the Cox regression, the probability of 
detection in the next unit of time. Consistent with the OLS estimate, the hazard ratio is significantly and 
negatively related to all three measures of CEO connectedness.   
FTA show higher levels of statistical significance than FDA for both fraud detection duration and 
the hazard ratio, consistent with Dyck et al. (2010), who find access to information is the key to fraud 
detection. Executives have more direct access to relevant information for fraud detection than outside 
directors, who tend to rely mostly on management for firm-specific information. The estimated 
coefficients also reveal that frauds are detected sooner with greater industry litigation, more financial 
analysts, smaller settlements, and weaker stock performance. 
IV.3. Coordination Costs and the Number of People Charged 
When wrongdoing requires coordinated action among multiple players, CEO connectedness may 
facilitate the wrongdoing. With more connected top executives and directors, the environment becomes 
more conducive for coordinated activities, making it easier to engage in frauds requiring more 
coordination (such as financial misstatements). We test this hypothesis by relating the log of the number 
of people charged plus one, Ln(Num_Charged +1), to FTA, FDA, FTA + FDA in Table IX. If 
coordination costs of wrongdoing are lower in firms with closer CEO connectedness, then it is less costly 
to involve more people in frauds and, hence, we might witness more people being involved with, and 
charged in, wrongdoing. We include all employees charged because each top-four connected executive 
may also have his own lower-tier connected managers and employees, and there are other executives 
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appointed by the CEO who are not on the top-four list. That is, some of the non-top-four executives and 
midlevel managers charged can be connected to the CEO directly or indirectly though top-four non-CEO 
executives. 
The set of control variables for this analysis differs sharply from previous regressions, as the 
purpose is to control for factors affecting the number of people charged. Some types of misbehavior may 
require more coordination than others, leading to more people being involved. For example, inflating 
earnings requires a number of people such as the CEO, CFO, accountants, and lawyers, to agree to the 
earnings figures (or at least not oppose them), compared to insider trading which the perpetrator requires 
no help. Thus, we include three indicators to distinguish different types of frauds: Accounting, Operating, 
and Executive. Accounting frauds are defined as misleading information about financial condition, 
expected growth, financial statements; misleading information to inflate stock price; violations of GAAP; 
and restating financial statements. Operating frauds include cases related to real corporate business 
activities. For example, a pharmaceutical company not disclosing dangerous side effects when 
announcing and marketing a new drug; a company violating environmental regulations; and a bank 
misleading customers. Executive frauds are defined as executives taking unlawful advantage of their 
positions to obtain a profit; for example, insider trading, related party transactions, and so on.  Of course, 
a fraud case may belong to multiple types.  
We also control for the total value of settlement, Tot_Settlement, because a large settlement tends 
to indicate large scale and/or scope in wrongdoing, which may require more participants. Industry 
dummies are included to account for the variation in the nature of frauds across industries and potential 
correlation among frauds in the same industry. Other controls include CEO tenure, Tobin’s Q, Ebitda/TA, 
sales growth, and leverage. The estimation is again based on cross-sectional data. Because this analysis 
includes fewer control variables than the fraud detection duration analysis, there are fewer missing 
variables, allowing us to use 308 unique fraud cases. As before, the CEO connectedness variables and the 
firm level control variables are their averages over each case’s fraud period. 
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Table IX reports estimation results, which show the number of people charged is positively and 
significantly related to all three connectedness variables. The low coordination costs due to close CEO 
connectedness seem to be an important facilitator of corporate wrongdoing.  
V. ROBUSTNESS  
This section provides robustness tests to alternative bi-variate probit model specifications, 
alternative measures of CEO connectedness, and an alternative sample construction. Re-estimation results, 
reported in Appendices 1 through 6, are summarized below.  
V.1. Alternative Bivariate Probit Specifications 
V.1.1. Alternative combinations of control variables  
 In our baseline model, all control variables in the detection equation are included in the 
commission equation. This is not the norm among studies using the bivariate probit model to study fraud, 
e.g., Wang et al. (2010). We relax this part of our baseline model by including in the commission 
equation only CEO characteristics, performance variables, firm size, leverage, IndustryQ, IndustryQ2, and 
ICR, while excluding variables mainly related to monitoring. The detection variables remain unchanged. 
The re-estimation results, reported in Appendix 1, Panel A, are robust.  
 In Panel B, we keep all the variables the same as in the baseline regression, except that we now 
include ICR in the detection equation. Wang and Winton (2012) argue industry competition is related to 
information about an individual firm, which, in turn could affect detection. This change in specification is 
unlikely to alter the results because the detection equation already includes the number of financial 
analysts, stock turnover, institutional investor concentration, firm size, and stock volatility, all of which 
reflect differences in information about individual firms. As expected, the re-estimation results are robust. 
V.1.2. Organizational changes 
Our results may be driven by major structural changes such as mergers, acquisitions, spin-offs, 
and divestitures, which can change the composition of executive suites and the board and thereby affect 
our measures of CEO connectedness. Mergers may also affect incentives to commit fraud; for example, a 
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bad acquisition and ensuing poor performance may lead to unlawful attempts to cover up big losses. Thus, 
we add to the baseline model the number of mergers and acquisitions, MAit-1, and divestitures and spinoffs, 
DSit-1, completed in the previous year. They reflect organizational changes due to acquisition, restructuring, 
spinoffs, and divestiture. The re-estimation results, reported in Appendix 1, Panel C, are robust.  
V.1.3. Clustering standard errors at the firm and the CEO-firm pair level  
In Table V, robust standard errors are clustered at the industry level to account for possible 
correlations among firms in the same industry. Because observations associated with a firm tend to be 
correlated, we also cluster standard errors at the firm level and at the CEO-firm pair level because CEO 
connectedness is a CEO-firm specific variable. Appendix 1, Panel D shows robust re-estimation results.  
V.2. Alternative Measures of CEO Connectedness 
 We also check robustness to three alternative measures of CEO connectedness by re-estimating 
the baseline bivariate probit model, forced CEO turnover-fraud sensitivity, fraud detection duration, and 
the number of people charged. In addition, we separate directors into independent and non-independent 
directors and estimate the effects of CEO connectedness with each type.  
V.2.1. Abnormal measures of FTA and FDA 
FTA and FDA may be correlated with CEO tenure, the average tenure of non-CEO top executives and 
board members, whether the CEO is recruited from outside, and whether she is in her first year in office. 
Thus, we estimate the following regression in Appendix 2, Panel A and use the residuals as abnormal 
measures of FTA and FDA, AFTA and AFDA.  
FTAit  = a0+ a1CEO_Tenureit + a2CEO_Tenureit2 + a3Execsenit   + a4Outsideit+ a5Unknown_Exeit                             
+ a6FTA_1Y_Exeit  + a7FTA_1Y_Unknown_Exeit + Yeart + εit                        (4a)  
FDAit  = a0+ a1CEO_Tenureit + a2CEO_Tenureit2 + a3Dircsenit   + a4Outsideit  + a5FTA_1Y_Dirit + Yeart 
+ εit                                                                                                                  (4b)                                                                                    
CEO_Tenureit is the number of years firm i‘s CEO has been in office by year t. We include 
CEO_Tenureit2 to allow for a non-linear relation between CEO tenure and the connected variables because 
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the maximum of FTA and FDA is one. 19 Execsenit and Dircsenit are the average number of years firm i’s 
top four non-CEO executives and directors have held their positions, respectively, by year t. Outsideit is 
an indicator equal to one if a CEO is from outside the firm. Unknown_Exeit is the fraction of executives 
whose first year on the list of the top four non-CEO executives cannot be identified based on data 
provided by ExecuComp. 20 This variable is designed to control for noise in FTAit and Execsenit due to 
ambiguity about the precise year in which some of the top executives were appointed. FTA_1Y_Exeit 
(FDA_1Y_Dirit) is the fraction of top executives (directors) appointed during a CEO's first year in office. 
(A new CEO appointment is sometimes followed by several top executive or director turnovers). 
FTA_1Y_Unknown_Exeit is the fraction of top executives for whom we cannot determine whether their 
appointment occurred during a CEO's first year in office. This controls for noise in FTA_1Y_Exeit. The 
regression also controls for year-fixed effects to account for macroeconomic factors affecting 
appointment and retention decisions of top executives and directors.  
We re-estimate Tables V, VII, VIII, IX using these measures of abnormal CEO connectedness in 
Appendix 2, Panels B through E.  All results are robust. 
V.2.2. Tenure Weighted FTA and FDA Measures 
In calculating FTA and FDA we treat all top non-CEO executives and directors equally. However, 
their relative influence may vary with their tenure. For example, a director who has been on the board for 
a long time may have greater influence than a newly-recruited director. A similar argument can be made 
for a top executive with long tenure. Thus, we calculate tenure weighted FTA_WT and FDA_WT by 
weighting each top executive and director (appointed during the CEO’s tenure) by the executive’s and the 
                                                 
19 If a CEO leaves the position and returns later, ExecuComp reports only the latest appointment date. Thus, simply comparing 
the CEO appointment date reported by ExecuComp with the current year may generate negative CEO tenure. We correct for this 
problem by backtracking the previous appointment year using the CEO and company names. 
20 ExecuComp provides appointment dates for CEOs, but not for other top executives (except for the CFO beginning in 2006). 
Hence, if an executive is already one of the top four non-CEO executives when the firm first appears in ExecuComp, we cannot 
determine when he first obtained the position. For such cases, we use the year the executive first appears in ExecuComp as the 
year of appointment to the top executive position and compare it with the year the current CEO took office to determine whether 
the executive was appointed during the CEO’s tenure. Since this method underestimates FTA, we include Unknown as a control 
variable to mitigate the underestimation problem. We do not need similar unknown controls for FDA because the director 
appointment date is rarely missing after 1998.   
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director’s tenure. (The weight is each individual’s tenure divided by the sum of all executives’ or 
directors’ tenure). We also calculate their abnormal measures, AFTA_WT and AFDA_WT, using the 
regression residuals based on FTA_WT and FDA_WT. Re-estimation results using these four different 
measures of CEO connectedness are reported in Appendix 3. The results are again robust.  
V.2.3. Compensation weighted FTA measures 
The top non-CEO executives’ relative influence also may vary across rank; for example, a CEO’s 
connectedness with the second highest-paid executive may matter more than her connectedness with the 
fourth highest-paid executive. Thus, we weight FTA by executives’ salaries and bonuses. FTA_WC is 
calculated the same way as FTA_WT, except the weight is based on non-CEO executives’ salaries and 
bonuses. AFTA_WC is the regression residual based on FTA_WC. We do not compensation weight FDA 
or AFDA because of the lack of variation in director compensation. Re-estimation results based on 
FTA_WC and AFTA_WC are reported in Appendix 4, Panels A through D. The results are robust.  
V.2.4. Independent vs. non-independent directors  
FDA covers all board members. However, CEO connectedness with independent directors may 
have different ramifications on corporate frauds than with non-independent directors. Non-independent 
directors include top executives and others with a material relationship with the firm, such as major 
stockholders, former executives, family members of a CEO or a major stockholder, suppliers, clients, 
strategic alliance partners, and interlocked partners. These directors are likely to have a different 
relationship with the CEO than independent directors, who are required to have no material relationship 
with the firm. Thus, we separately calculate the fraction of independent directors appointed (FIDA) 
during the current CEO’s tenure among independent directors and the fraction of non-independent 
directors appointed (FNIDA) during the CEO’s tenure among non-independent directors. (Because the 
denominator is different, FIDA and FNIDA do not sum to FDA.)  
In Appendix 5 the four key regressions are re-estimated separately for FIDA and FNIDA, and 
their abnormal measures, AFIDA and AFNIDA. Because of the finer breakdown of FDA, a number of 
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variables show weaker statistical significance. However, the overall results are consistent with those 
based on FDA, revealing that CEO connectedness with independent directors has more or less similar 
effects as connections with non-independent directors.  
V.3. Alternative Sample Construction – Inclusion of CEO-Unnamed Fraud Cases  
  All analyses thus far are conducted on a sample of fraud cases in which the CEO is a named 
respondent, excluding the 62 fraud cases in which the CEO is unnamed. For the CEO-unnamed cases, 
neither FTA nor FDA is positively correlated to the incidence of fraud, detection duration, and the 
number of people charged (see Table IV). A sufficient number of CEO-unnamed cases would have 
allowed us to test whether CEO connectedness helps to prevent and uncover misconduct when the CEO is 
not involved. Unfortunately, 62 fraud cases are insufficient to conduct a meaningful analysis, especially 
given the nature of the bi-variate probit model and the numerous control variables. So we do what we can: 
we combine the CEO unnamed cases with the CEO-named cases and re-estimate the four key regressions 
to study the net effects. If CEO connectedness helps to prevent and uncover misconduct when the CEO is 
not involved, given the CEO-unnamed cases constitute 16% of the fraud sample, we expect substantially 
weaker results than those based on CEO-named fraud cases alone. 
The re-estimation results are reported in Appendix 6. Many coefficients are smaller in magnitude 
with weaker statistical significance, reflecting the noise introduced by the CEO-unnamed fraud cases. 
However, the overall qualitative results do not change. This, together with the lack of significant 
correlations in CEO-unnamed cases (Table IV), seems to suggest that when CEOs are uninvolved, CEO 
connectedness has more or less neutral effects on misconduct. 
VI. INTERACTIVE EFFECTS WITH MONITORING MECHANISMS 
An important purpose of governance mechanisms is to deter and detect frauds; thus, a natural 
question follows: Do standard governance or monitoring mechanisms mitigate the adverse effects of CEO 
connectedness? In this section we address this question by estimating the interactive effects of CEO 
connectedness with internal and external monitoring mechanisms. We proxy for the strength of internal 
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monitoring by board and audit committee composition: the fraction of non-independent 
directors, %_NonIndepDirectors, and the fraction of non-independent directors on the audit 
committee, %_NonIndepDirectors_Audit. Table X, Panels A and B repeat the bivariate probit model 
estimation in Table V with interactions of FTA or FDA with %_NonIndepDirectors 
and %_NonIndepDirectors_Audit, respectively.  
Panel A reports insignificant coefficients on both interactions of FTA and FDA 
with %_NonIndepDirectors, though the signs are in the right direction. Board independence does not 
seem to significantly help guard against the adverse effects of CEO connectedness on wrongdoing. 
(Control variables are not reported.) Panel B shows more encouraging results: The interaction of FTA or 
FDA with %_NonIndepDirectors_Audit, the inverse of audit committee independence, is significant. It 
appears that a more independent audit committee helps negate the adverse effects of CEO connectedness 
on fraud.  
Panel C repeats the same exercise for external monitoring mechanisms, the strength of which is 
proxied by institutional ownership concentration, IOC. The interaction of FTA and IOC is insignificant, 
indicating external monitoring by institutional investors with concentrated ownership does not counteract 
CEO connectedness with top executives. However, the interaction of IOC and FDA in the detection 
equation shows a significant coefficient with a sign suggesting higher institutional ownership 
concentration exacerbates the negative effects of CEO connectedness with directors on the likelihood of 
detection. This is an intriguing result that does not render a ready explanation. However, institutional 
investors may sell stocks when they sense something fraudulent and, hence, may prefer to keep it hidden 
until they dispose of their holdings. 
All we can safely conclude, based on these interactive effects, is that greater audit committee 
independence helps counteract the adverse influence of CEO connectedness on corporate wrongdoing. 
The other standard internal and external monitoring measures do not seem to have significant effects, 
underscoring the importance of CEO connectedness as a factor in assessing the risk of corporate fraud. 
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VII. OTHER SOURCES OF CEO CONNECTIONS AND POWER 
VII.1. Pre-existing Network Ties  
Appointment and recruitment are not the only ways CEOs can be connected with their executives 
and board members. They can also be connected through pre-existing network ties. In this section we 
examine how CEOs’ pre-existing network ties with top executives and board members affect fraud. 
Chidambaran et al. (2012) find higher fraud probability when CEOs are more connected to board 
members via nonprofessional social connections, but find lower likelihood of fraud when the network ties 
are through past employment overlaps. We extend their analyses to account for the partial observability 
problem in fraud samples by estimating the bivariate probit model. We also investigate how CEO-top 
executive and CEO-board network tie relationships are related to the likelihood of fraud detection, forced 
CEO turnover-fraud sensitivity, detection duration, and the number of people charged.  
Pre-existing network ties are obtained by manually matching an individual’s name and age and 
company name in ExecuComp and RiskMetrics with those in BoardEx. BoardEx provides information for 
past employment, education background, and membership in social organizations (e.g., philanthropic and 
religious organizations, social clubs, and professional organizations). We count the number of network 
ties established during overlapping years through past employment, education, and membership in social 
organizations. We use the number of network ties for each category to capture the depth of past 
connections. We also sum the three types of ties to arrive at the total number of ties. To avoid reverse 
causality, we include only network ties formed prior to the CEO, the director, and the top executive 
joining the company. Similar measures of social connections have been used in previous papers (e.g., 
Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2008; Fracassi and Tate, 2012; Duchin and Sosyura, 2013). 
Information on network ties is often missing or incomplete because BoardEx does not cover all 
relevant individuals. This problem is especially severe prior to 2000. To avoid reducing the sample size, we 
do not drop the missing observations; instead, when information on network ties is missing or incomplete, 
we assume there is no tie, which leads to underestimation of network ties. To offset this problem, we 
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include as controls Pct_Known_Exe_Tie or Pct_Known_Dir_Tie, the percent of top executives or directors 
whose pre-existing network ties to their CEOs are known.  
Appendix 7 examines CEO’s network ties with top executives. Four measures of network ties are 
considered: the number of overlapping ties through employment, Dir_Tie_Emp; ties through education, 
Dir_Tie_Edu; ties through membership to social organizations, Dir_Tie_Soc; and the sum of the three, 
Dir_Tie. The control variables are the same as in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX. Estimation results are 
reported in Panels A through D without reporting control variables. All coefficients are insignificant, except 
for education ties in the detection equation in the bivariate model.21 It appears that the CEO’s connections 
with top executives through network ties seem to have mostly insignificant effects on the incidence of fraud 
and the expected costs of wrongdoing. 
We also investigate CEOs’ network ties with the board by repeating the same estimations for 
directors. The estimation results are reported in Appendix 8. The commission equation shows estimation 
results consistent with those reported in Chidambaran et al. (2012): The incidence of fraud is insignificantly 
related to the total number of ties; significantly and negatively related to network ties through past 
employment; and significantly and positively related to network ties through membership to social 
organizations. These results are comforting because they indicate the relations between specific network 
ties and fraud probabilities are robust to different estimation methodologies and samples.  
Nonetheless, our estimates also reveal that none of the CEO-board network ties is significantly 
related to the likelihood of detection given fraud. Unlike appointment-based connections, network 
connections do not seem to help hide wrongdoing. Also new is the significant and negative relation between 
fraud incidence and educational ties. The statistical relation between network ties and forced-CEO-
turnover-fraud sensitivity is weak; of the four interaction terms, only education ties shows a negative 
                                                 
21 The bivariate estimation result suggests that education ties with top executives help uncover frauds. Perhaps an executive who 
has gone to school with the CEO knows the CEO better and the familiarity makes detection more likely.  
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interaction coefficient significant at the 10% level. The statistical relations with fraud detection duration and 
the number of people charged are also mostly insignificant.  
Overall, it seems safe to conclude that as far as corporate fraud is concerned, appointment-based 
CEO connectedness within executive suites and the boardroom has markedly different effects from those 
based on social connections. As hypothesized at the outset of the paper, the loyalty factor in appointment-
based CEO connectedness seems to have much stronger effects on fraud than the familiarity bias arising 
from sharing common experiences.   
VII.2. CEO Power Index  
CEO power affects CEOs’ relationship with other corporate leaders and, hence, may also affect 
fraud incidence and detection. The bivariate model estimation in Table V and all alternative bivariate 
specifications in Appendix 1 show mostly insignificant coefficients on variables related to CEO power. In 
this section we take a closer look at the overall effects of CEO power by constructing a composite power 
index and re-estimate the four key regressions using the index as the main explanatory variable.  
The index, CEO_Power, captures power associated with official position, title, share ownership, 
and longevity. It is the sum of four indicator variables: CEO_Founder, CEO_Chair, H_CEO_OWN, and 
L_CEO_Tenure. H_CEO_OWN equals one if the CEO owns 10% or more of outstanding shares, and zero 
otherwise. L_CEO_Tenure equals one if the CEO’s current tenure is longer than four years (the sample 
median), and zero otherwise. Because the power index is the key explanatory variable, CEO_Founder, 
CEO_Chair, CEO_OWN, and CEO_Tenure are dropped as controls. The remaining control variables are 
the same as before.  
The results are presented in Appendix 9, Panels A through D without reporting control variables. 
Consistent with earlier results based on individual sources of CEO power, Panel A shows the composite 
CEO power index has insignificant effects on fraud incidence or the detection likelihood. Panel B also 
shows insignificant coefficients on the interaction of CEO_Power and Fraud_t-3-t, indicating CEO power 
does not help prevent dismissal upon discovery of fraud. Panel D shows the number of people charged is 
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also insignificantly related to CEO power. Only in the detection duration regression (Panel C) does CEO 
power have significant effects. Unlike appointment-based connectedness, the impacts of CEO power on the 
risk of fraud seems to quite weak, although the power helps delay its discovery.  
The CEO power index reflects only the ability to exert one’s own will on others, not the norms of 
social influence; reciprocity, liking, and social consensus, which are enhanced through appointment-based 
connectedness. What facilitates the acquiescence/coordination required for corporate wrongdoing seems to 
be social influence, not CEO power. The CEO power reflects one-way influence from the CEO to others, 
which is easier to resist when the intended action or inaction is against the law, i.e., wrongdoing.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
The collective behavior of corporate leaders is often critical in corporate wrongdoing, and the 
CEO often plays the central role.  Yet there is no comprehensive study exploring how CEOs and their 
influence within executive suites and the boardroom impact corporate wrongdoing. This paper focuses on 
the effects of CEOs’ social influence accumulated during the CEO’s tenure through top executive and 
director appointment decisions.  
We find appointment-based CEO connectedness is positively related to the likelihood of 
corporate fraud and negatively related to the likelihood of detection, given fraud. The relation is 
economically meaningful, statistically significant, and robust to instrumental variables regressions using 
CEO death, the number of executives’ and directors’ death during the current CEO’s tenure, and 
geographic remoteness of a firm’s headquarters as IVs. The relation is also robust to alternative 
specifications, several alternative measures of CEO connectedness, an alternate sample construction, and 
clustering standard errors at different levels.  
We also identify likely channels through which appointment-based CEO connectedness facilitates 
wrongdoing – by delaying detection, lowering the likelihood of CEO dismissal after fraud discovery, and 
reducing coordination costs of conducting frauds, all of which reduce the expected costs of wrongdoing. 
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Furthermore, only audit committee independence helps counteract the adverse effects of CEO 
connectedness. Other standard internal and external monitoring mechanisms seem rather ineffective.  
CEOs can also be connected to their executives and board members by sharing common network 
ties established through past employment, education, and membership to various social organizations. We 
investigate the link between these connections and fraud incidence, detection, forced CEO turnover-fraud 
sensitivity, and the number of people charged in fraud. The estimation results confirm some of the earlier 
findings by Chidambaran et al. (2012). However, CEOs’ network ties with executives or board members 
show mostly insignificant relations to fraud detection probability, the ability of CEOs tainted with fraud 
to retain their job, and the coordination cost of wrongdoing as measured by the number of people charged 
in frauds.  
Taken together, these results imply that the fraction of top executives and board members 
appointed during a CEO’s tenure (1) is a critical factor in assessing a firm’s likelihood of engaging in 
wrongdoing, (2) has effects that are not mitigated by standard monitoring mechanisms, except for audit 
committee independence, and thus (3) is worth the close attention of investors, regulators, and governance 
specialists. Further, our results underscore the importance of CEO connections built through personnel 
decisions in assessing the quality of governance and managing risk, as the connections seem to magnify 
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Table I. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Panel A: Fraud Variables 
















Indicator equal to one if fraud takes place anytime during the period over year t-3 to year t, and zero 
otherwise. 
Duration 
The number of days from the commencement of fraudulent activity to the fraud detection date. For the fraud 
cases covered by FSR database, the fraud detection date is the earliest of the following dates: (1) The date the 
target firm first announced it has received an informal request by regulators for information related to the 
subsequent enforcement action. (2) The date the target firm first announced it has received a notice of a formal 
order of investigation, received a subpoena, or was named a respondent in a warrant issued by regulators 
related to the subsequent enforcement action. (3) The date of the first regulatory proceeding filed in the related 
enforcement action. (4) The date of the first public announcement of an activity that reveals to investors a 
possible enforcement action in the future. This date is identified in the documents associated with regulatory 
proceedings; related private civil class action lawsuits; information associated with informal inquires, formal 
investigations, and Wells Notices; or information released by the firm. (5) The first date of the announcement 
of a receipt of a Wells Notice by an intended respondent to an enforcement action or the date the firm 
announces they have reached a settlement in an intended enforcement action. (6) The date on which the first 
related private civil class action lawsuit was filed for the same activity described in the enforcement action by 
regulators. For alleged fraud cases that are not in the FSR database but were found in either the SEC or 
SSCAC database, the earliest date provided by the relevant databases was used unless an earlier date was 
discovered in a media source. In the latter case the earlier media date was used.      
Num_Charged The number of people charged in the litigation or enforcement action.  
Accounting Indicator equal to one, if a fraud is identified as involving accounting matters. 
Operating Indicator equal to one, if a fraud is identified as involving real business activities. 
Executive Indicator equal to one if a fraud is identified as involving executives taking unlawful advantage of their positions for personal benefits. 
CEO_Jail&Bar Indicator equal to one if a CEO is sentenced to jail and/or barred from serving as a CEO of a publicly listed firm, and zero otherwise. 
Tot_Settlement Value of total settlement. The unit is 10 million dollars. Missing values are replaced by zero. 
Tot_Settlement_D Indicator equal to one, if Tot_Settlement is not missing, and zero otherwise.  
Panel B: CEO Connectedness Variables 
FTA Fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. 
ExecuComp 
AFTA Abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure.  
FTA_WT Fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ tenure.  
AFTA_WT Abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ tenure.  
FTA_WC Fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ salaries and bonuses.  
AFTA_WC Abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ salaries and bonuses.  
FDA Fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, excluding the CEO from both the numerator and denominator if the CEO is on the board. 
ExecuComp, 
RiskMetrics 
AFDA Abnormal fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure.  
FDA_WT Fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the directors’ tenure.  
AFDA_WT Abnormal fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the directors’ tenure.  
FTA+FDA Sum of FTA and FDA divided by 2. 
AFTA+AFDA Sum of AFTA and AFDA divided by 2. 
FIDA Fraction of independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure (i.e., the number of independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure divided by the total number of independent directors). 
AFIDA Abnormal fraction of independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. 
FNIDA 
Fraction of non-independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure (i.e., the number of 
non-independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure divided by the total number of 
non-independent directors.) 
AFNIDA Abnormal fraction of non-independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure.  
Dir_Tie 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past employment (either 
working as an employee or serving on the board), educational institutions, and past membership to social and 
professional organizations divided by the number of directors on the board. Only network ties established 





The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past employment (either 
working as an employee or serving on the board) divided by the number of directors on the board. Only 
network ties established during overlapping years are included. 
Dir_Tie_Edu 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past educational institutions 
divided by the number of directors on the board. Only network ties established during overlapping years are 
included. 
Dir_Tie_Soc 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past membership to social and 
professional organizations divided by the number of directors on the board. Only network ties established 




Table I. Variable Definitions and Data Sources (Continued). 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Pct_Known_Dir 
_Tie 
The percent of the directors whose pre-existing network ties to their CEOs are known.  
 
Exe_Tie 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with the top four non-CEO executives through past 
employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board), educational institutions, and past 
membership to social and professional organizations divided by 4. Only network ties established during 




The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with the top four non-CEO executives through past 
employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) divided by 4. Only network ties 
established during overlapping years are included. 
Exe_Tie_Edu 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with the top four non-CEO executives through past 
educational institutions divided by 4. Only network ties established during overlapping years are included. 
Exe_Tie_Soc 
The total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with the top four non-CEO executives through past 
membership to social and professional organizations divided by 4. Only network ties established during 
overlapping years are included. 
Pct_Known_Exe 
_Tie 
The percent of the top four non-CEO executives whose pre-existing network ties to their CEOs are known.  
Panel C: Variables to Construct AFTA and AFDA 
Outside Indicator equal to one, if a CEO comes from outside the firm and zero otherwise. 
ExecuComp 
Execsen The average tenure of the top four non-CEO executives. 
FTA_1Y_Exe The fraction of the top four non-CEO executives appointed during a CEO’s first year in office. 
Unknown_Exe 




The fraction of the top four non-CEO executives whose appointment cannot be determined as occurring 
during a CEO’s first year in office. 
Dircsen The average number of years for which each director has been on the board. ExecuComp, 
RiskMetrics FDA_1Y_Dir The fraction of directors appointed during a CEO’s first year in office. 
Panel D: Firm Characteristics and Business Condition Variables 
Tobin's Q 
The market value of common equity plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total 
assets.  
Compustat 
Ebitda/TA Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization divided by the book value of total assets. Compustat 
StockReturns Annual buy-and-hold stock returns. CRSP 
Leverage Sum of short- and long-term debt divided by the book value of total assets. Compustat 
SalesGrowth_3Yr The 3-year least squares annual growth rate of sales in percentage. ExecuComp 
Ln(TotalAssets) Logged value of the book value of total assets. Compustat 
IndustryQ 




Industry concentration ratio, as measured by the sum of the percentage market share (in sales) of the four 
biggest firms among all firms in Compustat in each industry in each year. Industries are defined by 
Fama-French (1997) industry groupings. 
Compustat 
MA The total number of mergers and acquisitions completed by a firm in the previous year. SDC 
DS The total number of divestitures and spinoffs completed by a firm in the previous year. SDC 
Panel E: Corporate Governance and Monitoring Variables 
Ln(BoardSize) Logged value of one plus the number of directors on the board.  Risk Metrics 
%_NonIndep 
Directors 
The number of non-independent directors, as defined by IRRC, divided by the total number of directors on 
the board.  
Risk Metrics 
Ln(BoardMeetings) Logged value of one plus the number of board meetings held during a given year. ExecuComp 
%_NonIndep 
Directors_Audit 
The number of non-independent directors as defined by IRRC on the audit committee, divided by the total 
number of audit committee members.  
Risk Metrics 
Ln(AuditComSize) Logged value of one plus the number of audit committee members. Risk Metrics 
Ln(Analyst) Logged value of one plus the number of analysts following a firm in a given year.  I/B/E/S  







Table I. Variable Definitions and Data Sources (Continued). 
 
Variables Definitions Sources 
Panel F: Litigation Risk Variables 
StockVolatilities Standard deviation of a firm’s daily stock returns in a given year. CRSP 
IndustryLitigation 
The yearly deviation from the average litigation intensity in an industry. The level of litigation 
intensity in an industry is the number of all alleged frauds against publicly-listed firms in an industry in 
a given year, divided by the total number of firms in Compustat for the same industry and the same 
year. Detection date is defined in the detection duration entry. Industries are defined by Fama-French 





StockTurnover (Number of shares traded in a year) / (Number of shares outstanding). CRSP 
Panel G: CEO Characteristics Variables 
CEO_OWN The percentage of outstanding common shares held by a CEO. 
ExecuComp 
CEO_Founder Indicator equal to one, if a CEO was the CEO five years prior to the first date when the firm appears in CRSP or Compustat, and zero otherwise. 
CEO_Chair Indicator equal to one when a CEO also chairs the board, and zero otherwise. 
Ln(CEO_Age) Logged value of CEO age. 
CEO_Tenure The number of years a CEO has been CEO. 
Forced_CEO 
_Turnover 
Indicator for forced CEO turnover, identified by following the procedures used in Parrino (1997) and 
Jenter and Kanaan (2011). If a CEO departure is reported by the press as the CEO is fired, forced out, 
or retires or resigns due to policy differences or pressure, it is classified as forced. All other departures 
for CEOs above and including age 60 are classified as voluntary (except for the cases due to litigation 
or other fraud). All departures for CEOs below age 60 are evaluated further and are classified as forced 
either if the article does not report the reason as death, poor health, or the acceptance of another 
position (including the chairmanship of the board); or if the article reports that the CEO is retiring, but 
does not announce the retirement at least six months before the succession. Finally, cases classified as 
forced are reclassified as voluntary if press reports convincingly explain the departure as due to 
previously undisclosed personal or business reasons that are unrelated to the firm’s activities. 
ExecuComp 
and Factiva 
Panel H: Instrumental Variables for CEO Connectedness Variables  
CEO_Death Indicator equal to one if the previous CEO leaves the CEO position due to death, and zero otherwise. It is defined over the current CEO’s entire tenure. 
ExecuComp 
and Factiva 
Exe_Death The number of top four non-CEO executives who left the position due to death during the current CEO’s tenure up to the current year. 
ExecuComp 
and Factiva 
Dir_Death The number of non-CEO directors who left the director position due to death during the current CEO’s tenure up to the current year.  
RiskMetrics 
and Factiva 









Table II. Sample Distribution. 
 
This table describes the sample firm-year observations. Panel A lists the sample distribution by year. Panel B lists 
the sample distribution by the fraction of executives appointed during a CEO’s tenure (FTA), the fraction of 
directors appointed during a CEO’s tenure (FDA), and their abnormal measures (AFTA and AFDA). Table I 
provides definitions of these variables. Column (2) shows the total number of firms with data available to calculate 
FTA or FDA. Columns (3) and (4) report the number and the percentage of firms alleged to have committed fraud 
among the sample firms. The sample covers the period 1996 through 2006. 
 
Panel A: Sample Distribution by Year 
Year # of Firms # of Firms with Frauds %_Fraud 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1996 1,518 34 2.240 
1997 1,551 56 3.611 
1998 1,607 58 3.609 
1999 1,684 94 5.582 
2000 1,670 114 6.826 
2001 1,562 118 7.554 
2002 1,574 104 6.607 
2003 1,630 87 5.337 
2004 1,637 79 4.826 
2005 1,628 75 4.607 
2006 1,736 67 3.859 
Total 17,797 886 4.978 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by FTA, FDA, and their Abnormal Measures (AFTA and AFDA) 
FTA/AFTA # of Firms # of Firms with Frauds %_Fraud 
FTA = 0.00 4,988 225 4.511 
FTA = 0.25 3,586 151 4.211 
FTA = 0.50 4,033 205 5.083 
FTA = 0.75 3,268 178 5.447 
FTA = 1.00 1,922 127 6.608 
AFTA ≤ 20 Percentile 3,562 190 5.334  
20 Percentile < AFTA ≤ 40 Percentile 3,557 167 4.695  
40 Percentile < AFTA ≤ 60 Percentile 3,560 134 3.764  
60 Percentile < AFTA≤ 80 Percentile 3,559 187 5.254  
80 Percentile < AFTA 3,559 208 5.844  
FDA/AFDA # of Firms # of Firms with Frauds %_Fraud 
FDA = 0.00 2,395 133 5.553  
0.00 < FDA ≤ 0.25 2,396 115 4.800  
0.25 < FDA ≤ 0.50 2,690 131 4.870  
0.50 < FDA ≤ 0.75 2,032 134 6.594  
0.75 < FDA ≤ 1.00 1,550 116 7.484  
AFDA ≤20 Percentile 2,213  132 5.965  
20 Percentile < AFDA ≤ 40 Percentile 2,213  142 6.417  
40 Percentile < AFDA ≤ 60 Percentile 2,212  120 5.425  
60 Percentile < AFDA ≤ 80 Percentile 2,213  119 5.377  





Table III. Summary Statistics of Key Variables for the Full, Fraud, and Non-Fraud Samples. 
This table reports summary statistics for key variables. Panel A contains the statistics for the full sample. Panel B reports the mean of each variable 
separately for the fraud and non-fraud sample. Columns (8) and (9) show for each variable the difference in mean between the fraud and non-fraud 
sample and the P-value of the difference, respectively. The definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** 
are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
  Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Fraud and Non-Fraud Firm Samples 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min Max Fraud Non-Fraud (8)=(6)-(7) P-value 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Fraud Variables 
Fraud 0.050 0.000 0.218 0.000 1.000     Fraud_t-3-t 0.058 0.000 0.234 0.000 1.000     CEO_Jail&Bar 0.002 0.000 0.046 0.000 1.000     Duration_Day 1073.051 794.000 919.153 25.000 5548.000     Num_Charged 4.867 3.000 3.953 1.000 24.000     Tot_Settlement 5.046 0.300 44.139 0.000 762.700     Tot_Settlement_D 0.698 1.000 0.460 0.000 1.000     Accounting 0.927 1.000 0.261 0.000 1.000     Operating 0.343 0.000 0.475 0.000 1.000     Executive 0.419 0.000 0.494 0.000 1.000     CEO Connectedness Variables 
FTA 0.409 0.500 0.336 0.000 1.000 0.452 0.407 0.045*** (0.000) 
AFTA 0.000 0.008 0.292 -0.907 1.096 0.012 -0.001 0.013 (0.212) 
FTA_WT 0.347 0.263 0.323 0.000 1.000 0.391 0.345 0.046*** (0.000 ) 
AFTA_WT 0.000 -0.030 0.285 -0.837 1.009 0.013 -0.001 0.014 (0.160) 
FTA_WC 0.389 0.374 0.336 0.000 1.000 0.440 0.386 0.054*** (0.000 ) 
AFTA_WC 0.000 -0.011 0.292 -0.895 1.076 0.020 -0.001 0.022** (0.032 ) 
FDA 0.369 0.333 0.301 0.000 1.000 0.410 0.366 0.043*** (0.000) 
AFDA 0.000 -0.006 0.147 -1.095 0.798 -0.009 0.001 -0.009 (0.127) 
FIDA 0.435 0.400 0.359 0.000 1.000 0.474 0.433 0.041*** (0.005) 
AFIDA 0.000 -0.005 0.172 -1.228 0.960 -0.011 0.001 -0.012* (0.093) 
FDA_WT 0.220 0.113 0.254 0.000 1.000 0.257 0.218 0.039*** (0.000) 
AFDA_WT 0.000 -0.022 0.145 -0.831 0.783 -0.006 0.000 -0.006 (0.285) 
FTA+FDA 0.420 0.429 0.260 0.000 1.000 0.449 0.418 0.031*** (0.004) 
AFTA+AFDA 0.022 0.025 0.159 -0.700 0.810 0.016 0.023 -0.007 (0.269) 
Dir_Tie 0.541 0.556 0.425 0.000 3.333 0.529 0.541 -0.013 (0.388) 
Dir_Tie_Emp 0.365 0.308 0.349 0.000 3.000 0.346 0.366 -0.021* (0.085) 
Dir_Tie_Edu 0.090 0.100 0.071 0.000 0.833 0.091 0.090 0.001 (0.631 ) 
Dir_Tie_Soc 0.085 0.091 0.066 0.000 0.778 0.092 0.085 0.007*** (0.002) 
Pct_Known_Dir_Tie 0.709 1.000 0.421 0.000 1.000 0.749 0.707 0.042*** (0.004) 
Exe_Tie 0.282 0.000 0.448 0.000 4.500 0.303 0.281 0.022 (0.158) 
Exe_Tie_Emp 0.273 0.000 0.443 0.000 4.500 0.287 0.272 0.015 (0.321) 
Exe_Tie_Edu 0.008 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.750 0.014 0.008 0.006*** (0.001) 
Exe_Tie_Soc 0.001 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.500 0.002 0.001 0.001** (0.041 ) 
Pct_Known_Exe_Tie 0.823 1.000 0.295 0.000 1.000 0.851 0.822 0.030*** (0.003) 
Firm Characteristics and Business Condition Variables 
Tobin's Q 2.097 1.503 2.604 0.298 105.090 2.657 2.068 0.589*** (0.000) 
Ebitda/TA 0.129 0.127 0.123 -2.948 0.991 0.111 0.130 -0.018*** (0.000) 
StockReturns 0.068 0.108 0.483 -3.836 3.303 -0.109 0.077 -0.186*** (0.000) 
Leverage 0.223 0.214 0.175 0.000 0.959 0.245 0.222 0.023*** (0.000) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 17.325 9.929 63.582 -91.136 3559.292 31.287 16.596 14.691*** (0.000) 
Log(TotalAssets) 0.639 0.461 1.742 -5.419 7.541 1.310 0.604 0.706*** (0.000) 
IndustryQ 1.509 1.344 0.491 0.842 3.497 1.594 1.504 0.090*** (0.000 ) 
ICR 0.326 0.293 0.143 0.087 0.981 0.325 0.326 -0.001 (0.782) 
MA 0.854 0.000 1.792 0.000 72.000 1.317 0.830 0.487*** (0.000) 
DS 0.259 0.000 0.826 0.000 18.000 0.466 0.248 0.218*** (0.000) 
CEO Characteristics Variables 
CEO_OWN 0.025 0.003 0.062 0.000 0.761 0.023 0.025 -0.002 (0.333) 
CEO_Founder 0.137 0.000 0.344 0.000 1.000 0.200 0.134 0.066*** (0.000) 
CEO_Chair 0.494  0.000  0.500  0.000  1.000  0.538 0.492 0.046*** (0.002) 
Ln(CEO_Age) 3.313 3.367 0.290 0.000 4.159 3.246 3.317 -0.070*** (0.000) 
CEO_Tenure 6.703 4.000 7.142 0.000 55.000 7.418 6.666 0.752*** (0.002) 
Forced_CEO_Turnover  0.029  0.000 0.169  0.000  1.000  0.037 0.029  0.008 (0.159) 
Coporate Governance and Monitoring Variables 
Ln(BoardSize) 2.350 2.303 0.267 0.693 3.689 2.367 2.349 0.018 (0.116) 
%_NonIndepDirectors 0.336 0.308 0.174 0.000 1.000 0.334 0.336 -0.002 (0.755) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) 2.070 2.079 0.351 0.000 4.220 2.160 2.065 0.095*** (0.000) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit 0.033 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.778 0.033 0.033 0.000 (0.978) 
Ln(AuditComSize) 1.262 1.386 0.604 0.000 2.485 1.385 1.255 0.130*** (0.000) 
Ln(Analyst) 1.966 2.197 1.059 0.000 3.951 2.216 1.953 0.263*** (0.000) 
IOC 0.413 0.386 0.139 0.162 1.000 0.394 0.414 -0.020*** (0.000) 
Litigation Risk Variables 
StockVolatilities 0.028 0.024 0.016 0.000 0.231 0.033 0.027 0.006*** (0.000) 
IndustryLitigation 0.009 0.004 0.021 -0.022 0.129 0.015 0.009 0.006*** (0.000) 
StockTurnover 1.842 1.272 1.852 0.000 51.324 2.776 1.793 0.983*** (0.000) 
Instrumental Variables for CEO Connectedness Variables 
CEO_Death 0.005 0.000 0.071 0.000 1.000 0.003 0.005 -0.002 (0.472) 
Exe_Death 0.019 0.000 0.167 0.000 2.000 0.009 0.020 -0.011* (0.056 ) 
Dir_Death 0.015 0.000 0.124 0.000 2.000 0.020 0.015 0.006 (0.186) 




Table IV. Pair-wise Correlations between Fraud-related Variables and CEO Connectedness Variables. 
 
This table reports the pair-wise correlations between CEO connectedness variables and the fraud indicator, fraud 
detection duration in days, and the number of people charged in litigation or enforcement actions. Panel A reports 
the correlations for fraud cases in which the CEO is a named respondent; Panel B, fraud cases in which the CEO is 
unnamed. The pair-wise correlations between the fraud indicator and FTA or FDA are based on the panel data of 
all firm-year observations. The pair-wise correlations of FTA or FDA with detection duration and the number of 
people charged are based on the cross-sectional data at the fraud case level, using the average FTA or FDA over 
the fraud period. The definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** 
are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
    FTA FDA 
Panel A: CEO-Named Cases 
Fraud 0.029*** 0.033*** 
Detection Duration Days 0.107* 0.1021 
Num_Charged 0.100* 0.138** 
Panel B: CEO-Unnamed Cases 
Fraud 0.002 -0.013 
Detection Duration Days -0.053 0.072 





Table V. Bivariate Probit Model Estimation for Corporate Frauds and Appointment-based CEO Connectedness. 
 
This table reports the bivariate model estimation results. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the estimated relations between 
appointment-based CEO connectedness and the incidence of fraud, and Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the estimated relations between 
appointment-based CEO connectedness and the likelihood of detection, given fraud. The sample covers the period 1996 through 2006. 
Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. All regressions include year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
industry level are reported in parentheses. Industries are classified by Fama-French 48 industry groupings. Coefficients marked with *, 
**, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FTA 1.065*** -0.992*** 
    
 
(0.251) (0.264) 




   
(0.504) (0.433) 
  FTA+FDA 
    
1.593*** -1.475*** 
     
(0.478) (0.536) 
Tobin's Q -0.238*** 0.212*** -0.207*** 0.174** -0.282** 0.250** 
 
(0.088) (0.080) (0.071) (0.069) (0.137) (0.118) 
Ebitda/TA 0.602 -1.062 0.725 -0.841 0.579 -0.857 
 
(1.389) (1.143) (1.515) (1.198) (1.677) (1.298) 
Leverage -0.184 0.241 0.357 -0.094 -0.407 0.478 
 
(0.990) (0.894) (0.960) (0.753) (1.937) (1.641) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.012*** -0.007** 0.011*** -0.005* 0.015* -0.008 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.008) (0.006) 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.127 0.198*** -0.156 0.217** -0.132 0.207*** 
 





































 CEO_OWN 6.681 -5.543 -0.094 1.104 1.263 -0.483 
 
(8.393) (7.105) (6.396) (5.760) (8.802) (7.456) 
(CEO_OWN)2 -17.860 13.257 -2.145 -2.543 -9.997 5.336 
 
(21.093) (17.882) (18.563) (16.320) (15.456) (14.346) 
CEO_Founder 0.517 -0.358 1.231*** -0.825** 0.582 -0.430 
 
(0.489) (0.463) (0.426) (0.397) (0.946) (0.743) 
CEO_Chair 0.236 -0.201 0.520 -0.412 0.278 -0.223 
 
(0.288) (0.241) (0.366) (0.353) (0.406) (0.323) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.081 -0.063 0.425 -0.437 0.260 -0.294 
 
(0.470) (0.442) (0.502) (0.437) (0.623) (0.570) 
Ln(BoardSize) -2.402*** 2.295*** -2.994*** 2.588*** -2.930*** 2.662*** 
 
(0.550) (0.542) (0.644) (0.674) (0.596) (0.622) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -1.957** 2.005*** -2.760*** 2.417*** -2.233** 2.114** 
 
(0.786) (0.726) (0.941) (0.889) (1.023) (0.961) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) -0.092 0.174 -0.700* 0.652** -0.258 0.302 
 
(0.371) (0.338) (0.362) (0.304) (0.651) (0.509) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit -2.350 1.812 1.020 -0.964 -2.184 1.711 
 
(2.179) (2.301) (2.076) (1.906) (4.153) (3.751) 
Ln(AuditComSize) 0.684 -0.486 0.307 -0.219 0.671 -0.508 
 
(0.455) (0.452) (0.453) (0.405) (0.733) (0.632) 
StockVolatilities 9.328 -3.802 7.466 -1.151 3.793 0.982 
 
(12.445) (9.816) (15.088) (11.325) (10.919) (9.113) 
IndustryLitigation 12.453*** -8.045** 5.832 -2.889 10.026* -5.931 
 
(4.087) (3.713) (5.535) (4.286) (5.262) (4.379) 
CEO_Tenure -0.037 0.036 -0.085*** 0.069*** -0.060 0.057** 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.018) (0.042) (0.029) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.125 0.129 0.139 -0.133 -0.035 0.006 
 
(0.241) (0.198) (0.227) (0.208) (0.211) (0.191) 
IOC -1.068 1.315 -0.267 0.514 -0.956 1.127 
 
(1.252) (1.124) (1.001) (0.800) (1.134) (1.071) 
StockTurnover -0.206*** 0.241*** -0.196*** 0.216*** -0.186*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.042) (0.037) (0.061) (0.050) (0.050) (0.047) 
Constant 6.032*** -6.294*** 8.414*** -7.954*** 8.361*** -8.260*** 
 
(2.249) (1.796) (2.221) (2.129) (2.350) (2.475) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




Table VI. Instrumental Variable Regressions for Corporate Fraud and Appointment-based CEO Connectedness.  
This table reports the instrumental variable regression estimation results. The endogenous variables are FTA and FDA. The instrumental variables 
are CEO_Death, Exe_Death and Remoteness for FTA; CEO_Death, Dir_Death and Remoteness for FDA. All regressions control for year 
dummies. The first-stage regression estimation results are reported in Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6); the second-stage regression estimation results are 
reported in Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8). F-test of joint significance of instrumental variables is reported in the first stage regressions. The sample 
covers the period 1996 through 2006. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
 
FTA Fraud Detect|Fraud FDA Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 








  Exe_Death 0.057*** 0.057*** 
      
 
(0.018) (0.018) 
      Dir_Death 
    
0.015 0.015 
  
     
(0.018) (0.018) 








  FTA_Hat 
  
11.395* -17.288** 
    
   
(6.317) (7.115) 
    FDA_Hat 
      
20.497** -14.912** 
       
(7.997) (7.021) 
Tobin's Q -0.000 -0.000 -0.087* 0.113 -0.003** -0.003** 0.017 -0.017 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.050) (0.087) (0.002) (0.002) (0.036) (0.033) 
Ebitda/TA 0.075* 0.075* -4.349*** 5.377*** -0.028 -0.028 1.378* -1.356** 
 
(0.041) (0.041) (1.068) (1.217) (0.031) (0.031) (0.709) (0.534) 
Leverage 0.019 0.019 -2.020*** 3.174*** 0.042** 0.042** 0.183 0.110 
 
(0.021) (0.022) (0.381) (0.526) (0.016) (0.016) (0.443) (0.360) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr -0.000*** -0.000*** 0.010*** -0.008*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002 0.005 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.003) 
Ln(TotalAssets) 0.007** 0.007** -0.003 0.130* -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.064 0.054 
 

















































 CEO_OWN -0.886*** -0.886*** 16.148** -22.357** 0.162 0.162 0.219 1.156 
 
(0.141) (0.142) (7.435) (9.106) (0.110) (0.110) (3.132) (2.746) 
(CEO_OWN)2 1.092*** 1.092*** -31.608** 39.585*** -0.682** -0.682** -4.586 -1.977 
 
(0.377) (0.379) (13.032) (15.355) (0.284) (0.284) (9.480) (8.488) 
CEO_Founder -0.191*** -0.191*** 1.296 -1.533 -0.083*** -0.083*** 3.272*** -2.145*** 
 
(0.015) (0.015) (1.244) (1.459) (0.012) (0.012) (0.914) (0.759) 
CEO_Chair 0.029*** 0.029*** -0.593* 0.889** 0.047*** 0.047*** -0.160 0.148 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.355) (0.436) (0.007) (0.007) (0.421) (0.364) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.003 -0.003 -0.624** 0.650* 0.011 0.011 0.522* -0.441* 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.302) (0.390) (0.011) (0.011) (0.267) (0.240) 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.005 -0.005 -1.059***  1.455*** 0.067*** 0.067*** -3.594*** 2.723*** 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.404) (0.559) (0.014) (0.014) (0.547) (0.549) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -0.323*** -0.323*** 4.781** -6.930*** -0.132*** -0.132*** 0.421 -0.243 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (1.945) (2.105) (0.021) (0.021) (1.197) (1.063) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) 0.041*** 0.041*** -0.179 0.432 0.003 0.003 -1.035*** 0.804*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.377) (0.467) (0.008) (0.008) (0.245) (0.208) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit 0.368*** 0.367*** -6.166*** 8.684*** 0.131*** 0.131*** -1.425 0.915 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (2.332) (2.505) (0.045) (0.045) (1.427) (1.289) 
Ln(AuditComSize) 0.025 0.025 0.244 -0.119 -0.028** -0.028** 0.040 -0.005 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.286) (0.357) (0.012) (0.012) (0.350) (0.289) 
StockVolatilities 1.169*** 1.171*** 7.979 1.547 0.041 0.041 18.233* -4.894 
 
(0.435) (0.437) (8.510) (10.117) (0.321) (0.322) (10.647) (7.454) 
IndustryLitigation 0.194 0.195 0.113 3.409 0.038 0.038 2.223 0.394 
 
(0.175) (0.176) (1.964) (3.208) (0.124) (0.124) (4.960) (2.899) 
CEO_Tenure 0.021*** 0.021*** -0.224* 0.340** 0.033*** 0.033*** -0.753*** 0.545** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.134) (0.153) (0.001) (0.001) (0.273) (0.239) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.003 -0.003 0.184 -0.187 0.012** 0.012** -0.101 0.071 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.127) (0.187) (0.005) (0.005) (0.130) (0.113) 
IOC 0.050 0.050 -1.387 2.424* -0.023 -0.023 1.218 -0.540 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (1.080) (1.454) (0.027) (0.028) (0.816) (0.669) 
StockTurnover -0.001 -0.001 -0.243*** 0.265*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.461*** 0.384*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.063) (0.056) (0.002) (0.002) (0.144) (0.118) 
Constant 0.222*** 0.223*** -5.559*** 6.594*** -0.047 -0.047 7.850*** -6.838*** 
 
(0.071) (0.071) (1.800) (2.154) (0.054) (0.054) (1.489) (1.328) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 6,250 6,250 
Adjusted R2 0.160 0.160 
  
0.551 0.551 










Table VII. Forced CEO Turnover-Fraud Sensitivity and Appointment-based CEO Connectedness. 
 
This table estimates the impact of appointment-based CEO connectedness on forced CEO turnover-fraud sensitivity. The dependent 
variable is an indicator of forced CEO turnover. The relations are estimated by the OLS in Panel A; and by the conditional logit model 
in Panel B. OLS regressions control for firm and year fixed effects. Conditional logit regressions control for year dummies. The sample 
covers the period 1996 through 2006. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors clustered at the firm 





Panel A: OLS Panel B: Clogit 























































Fraud_t-3-t 0.144*** 0.071* 0.120*** 1.597** 0.788 1.333* 
 
(0.041) (0.037) (0.047) (0.722) (0.571) (0.807) 
Tobin's Q -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.020 0.043 0.024 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.040) (0.028) (0.034) 
Ebitda/TA -0.031 -0.014 -0.021 -0.751 -1.131 -1.352 
 
(0.048) (0.053) (0.054) (1.967) (2.146) (2.405) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Ln(TotalAssets) 0.004 0.010 0.010 -0.228 0.051 -0.206 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.473) (0.473) (0.534) 
ICR -0.035 -0.140 -0.122 -6.313* -7.689 -8.485 
 
(0.073) (0.110) (0.111) (3.751) (5.331) (5.808) 
CEO_Founder 0.084*** 0.098*** 0.068** 5.109*** 6.256*** 4.513** 
 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (1.837) (2.010) (1.796) 
CEO_Chair -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 -0.294 -0.257 -0.424 
 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.290) (0.341) (0.345) 
Ln(CEO_Age) 0.084*** 0.104*** 0.109*** 2.081*** 1.577** 1.836** 
 
(0.026) (0.035) (0.034) (0.751) (0.737) (0.760) 
Ln(BoardSize) -0.022 -0.018 -0.028 -1.335* -1.178 -1.437 
 
(0.019) (0.024) (0.023) (0.804) (0.890) (0.930) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -0.019 -0.031 -0.036 0.427 -0.809 -0.579 
 
(0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (1.237) (1.417) (1.577) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.971** 0.705* 0.726* 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.405) (0.404) (0.438) 
CEO_Tenure -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003* -0.499*** -0.438** -0.301** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.138) (0.174) (0.132) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.017* -0.013 -0.013 -0.850** -0.590* -0.491 
 
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.386) (0.353) (0.368) 
IOC 0.084*** 0.084** 0.082** 4.088*** 3.585** 2.677* 
 
(0.032) (0.041) (0.041) (1.519) (1.500) (1.608) 
IndustryLitigation 0.323** 0.325** 0.324** 7.843** 6.466* 7.075* 
 
(0.141) (0.156) (0.155) (3.904) (3.712) (3.854) 
CEO_Jail&Bar 0.135 0.164 0.161 12.320*** 18.710*** 14.636*** 
 
(0.085) (0.111) (0.102) (1.601) (1.916) (1.670) 
Constant -0.232** -0.252* -0.218 
   
 
(0.101) (0.135) (0.133) 
   Firm FE Y Y Y N N N 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 8,265 6,546 6,546 1,325 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.116 0.131 





Table VIII. Fraud Detection Duration, the Hazard Ratio and Appointment-based CEO Connectedness. 
 
This table relates appointment-based CEO connectedness to fraud detection duration and the hazard ratio. The sample 
covers 296 fraud cases over the period 1996 through 2006. Panels A and B report estimation results by the OLS and the 
Cox regressions, respectively. The dependent variable in Panel A is the logged value of the number of days from the 
commencement of fraudulent activity to the detection date; in Panel B, the hazard ratio for the Cox regression. All 
regressions control for industry dummies. CEO connectedness and control variables are their average values over the 
fraud period. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are 
reported in parenthesis. Industries are classified by Fama-French 48 industry groupings. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Panel A: Ln(Duration_Day)  Panel B: _t 




























Tot_Settlement 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tot_Settlement_D -0.643*** -0.582*** -0.585*** 0.892*** 0.789*** 0.820*** 
 
(0.103) (0.170) (0.166) (0.154) (0.228) (0.221) 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.058* 0.048 0.033 0.061 -0.146** -0.129** 
 
(0.031) (0.040) (0.040) (0.053) (0.061) (0.052) 
StockReturns 0.413*** 0.401*** 0.374*** -0.846*** -1.124*** -1.026*** 
 
(0.078) (0.124) (0.137) (0.218) (0.345) (0.373) 
Ebitda/TA 0.405 1.357** 1.300* -0.882 -2.954*** -2.894*** 
 
(0.591) (0.621) (0.659) (0.991) (1.054) (1.053) 
Leverage 0.328 0.361 0.431 -0.203 -0.449 -0.489 
 
(0.251) (0.396) (0.403) (0.398) (0.716) (0.618) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.000* 0.001* 0.001** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
StockVolatilities -9.520* -6.360 -7.017 4.849 -5.675 -3.119 
 
(5.093) (7.042) (7.164) (7.073) (11.633) (11.199) 
StockTurnover 0.015 0.036 0.041 -0.007 -0.053 -0.058 
 
(0.025) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.060) (0.058) 
IndustryLitigation -5.865*** -6.097*** -6.169*** 8.780*** 7.916*** 8.443*** 
 
(1.784) (1.709) (1.768) (2.477) (2.430) (2.421) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.093 -0.363*** -0.367*** 0.166* 0.559*** 0.601*** 
 
(0.065) (0.098) (0.097) (0.092) (0.127) (0.131) 
CEO_Chair 0.123 0.052 0.040 -0.247 -0.244 -0.200 
 
(0.128) (0.132) (0.130) (0.202) (0.221) (0.218) 
CEO_Founder -0.182 -0.307 -0.280 0.393 0.368 0.380 
 
(0.262) (0.383) (0.383) (0.470) (0.522) (0.510) 
CEO_Tenure 0.017* 0.014 0.012 -0.036** -0.026 -0.021 
 
(0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
CEO_OWN -0.846 -2.840 -2.012 -1.944 2.229 0.593 
 
(2.110) (3.492) (3.366) (3.603) (4.432) (4.350) 
(CEO_OWN)2 3.246 7.860 5.120 4.958 -5.072 -0.625 
 
(7.751) (12.030) (11.238) (11.944) (15.764) (15.170) 
Constant 7.524*** 7.704*** 7.627*** 
   
 
(0.263) (0.380) (0.377) 
   Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 228 228 296 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.279 0.287 







Table IX: Number of People Charged and Appointment-based CEO Connectedness. 
 
This table estimates the relations between appointment-based CEO connectedness and the number of people charged in 
litigation or enforcement actions. The dependent variable, Ln(Num_Charged+1), is the logged value of the number of 
people charged in litigation or enforcement actions plus one. The sample covers 308 fraud cases over the period 1996 
through 2006. The CEO connectedness variables and the control variables are their average values over the fraud 
period. All regressions control for industry dummies. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in parentheses. Industries are classified by Fama-French 48 


















   
(0.245) 
Tobin's Q -0.000 -0.006 -0.005 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ebitda/TA 0.415 0.418 0.287 
 
(0.249) (0.297) (0.274) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 0.296 0.320* 0.315* 
 
(0.223) (0.182) (0.180) 
Accounting 0.330* 0.264* 0.292* 
 
(0.170) (0.148) (0.153) 
Operating 0.183** 0.125 0.103 
 
(0.072) (0.104) (0.097) 
Executive 0.185** 0.126 0.110 
 
(0.079) (0.100) (0.099) 
CEO_Tenure 0.002 -0.009 -0.005 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Tot_Settlement 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Tot_Settlement_D 0.070 0.028 0.025 
 
(0.086) (0.096) (0.091) 
Constant 0.995*** 1.090*** 1.012*** 
 
(0.220) (0.225) (0.247) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 308 234 234 





Table X: Interactive Effects of Appointment-based CEO Connectedness and Monitoring on Corporate Frauds.. 
 
This table reports the bivariate probit model estimation results of interactive effects of appointment-based CEO 
connectedness and monitoring mechanisms on corporate frauds. Panels A, B, and C report the estimated interactive effects 
for board independence, audit committee independence, and institutional investor concentration, respectively. Control 
variables are identical to those in Table V but their coefficients are not reported. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table I. All regressions include year dummies. Robust standard errors clustered at the industry level are reported in 
parentheses. Industries are classified by Fama-French 48 industry groupings. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Interaction with Board Independence 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          




  FDA 
  
0.684 -0.262 
   
(0.925) (0.806) 




  FDA*%_NonIndepDirectors 
  
2.686 -3.180 
   
(2.253) (2.048) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -0.765* 2.807*** -4.012*** 3.962*** 
 
(0.423) (0.650) (1.373) (1.304) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1257 -1257 -1096 -1096 
Panel B: Interaction with Audit Committee Independence 




  FDA 
  
0.806 -0.604 
   
(0.688) (0.547) 




  FDA*%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit 
  
9.047* -8.776* 
   
(5.352) (4.952) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit -3.749* 3.058 -2.410 2.428 
 
(2.023) (2.390) (2.685) (2.696) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1252 -1252 -1097 -1097 
Panel C: Interaction with IOC 




  FDA 
  
0.160 0.235 
   
(0.563) (0.675) 




  FDA*IOC 
  
1.973 -4.039** 
   
(1.366) (1.432) 
IOC -1.887 2.267* -0.465 3.178*** 
 
(1.309) (1.281) (0.683) (0.957) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 







Appendices 1 through 6 contain estimation results of robustness tests to alternative bivariate 
probit specifications, alternative measures of appointment-based CEO connectedness, 
separating directors into independent and non-independent directors, and an alternative 
sample construction. Appendices 7 through 9 contain re-estimation results employing 
pre-existing network ties and a CEO power index in place of appointment-based CEO 
connectedness measures.  
  
Appendix 1: Alternative specifications of the bivariate probit model estimation. 
 Panel A: Excluding monitoring variables from the fraud incidence regression. 
 Panel B: Controlling ICR in both fraud incidence and detection regressions. 
 Panel C: Controlling for firm organizational changes. 
 Panel D: Alternative clustering standard errors. 
 
Appendix 2: Abnormal measures of appointment-based CEO connectedness. 
Appendix 3: Tenure-weighted appointment-based CEO connectedness variables. 
Appendix 4: Compensation-weighted appointment-based CEO connectedness variables. 
Appendix 5: Separating directors into independent and non-independent directors. 
Appendix 6: Fraud sample including CEO-unnamed fraud cases. 
Appendix 7: Pre-existing network ties between the CEO and top executives. 
Appendix 8: Pre-existing network ties between the CEO and directors. 
Appendix 9: A CEO power index consisting of indicators for CEO-chair, founder-CEO, high 




Appendix 1, Panel A: Alternative Specification for the Bivariate Probit Model Estimation – Excluding monitoring variables 
from the fraud incidence regression. 
 
This table reports re-estimation results of the bivariate probit model while excluding monitoring variables from the fraud incidence 
regression. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 




  FDA 
  
0.874** -0.650* 




















































































































 Ln(TotalAssets) -0.224*** 0.276*** -0.246*** 0.278*** 
 
(0.081) (0.061) (0.070) (0.060) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.517 0.293 -0.574 0.296 
 
(0.465) (0.348) (0.652) (0.465) 
Tobin's Q -0.088 0.062 -0.099* 0.052 
 
(0.097) (0.083) (0.060) (0.040) 
Ebitda/TA -2.224 1.267 0.803 -0.832 
 
(3.280) (2.637) (0.822) (0.642) 
Leverage -1.290 1.231 -1.159 0.968 
 
(0.883) (0.786) (0.952) (0.759) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.006*** -0.001 0.005* -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
CEO_Founder -0.263 0.309 0.009 0.067 
 
(0.596) (0.546) (0.350) (0.293) 
CEO_Chair 0.608* -0.504 0.624** -0.450 
 
(0.366) (0.387) (0.318) (0.312) 
CEO_Tenure -0.039* 0.038* -0.027 0.022 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.018) 
CEO_OWN 12.955** -10.542* 2.799 -0.875 
 
(5.972) (6.072) (4.713) (3.897) 
(CEO_OWN)2 -43.034** 34.422 -11.645 3.678 
 
(19.705) (23.401) (15.050) (12.755) 
Constant -0.028 -0.858 7.047** -3.626** 
 
(1.438) (1.375) (2.874) (1.605) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Appendix 1, Panel B: Alternative Specification for Bivariate Probit Model Estimation - Controlling ICR in Both Fraud and 
Detection Regressions 
 
This table reports re-estimation results of the bivariate probit model while controlling ICR in both fraud incidence and detection 
regressions. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 




  FDA 
  
1.332* -1.244** 
   
(0.684) (0.553) 
Tobin's Q -0.245*** 0.225*** -0.345*** 0.319*** 
 
(0.086) (0.084) (0.103) (0.093) 
Ebitda/TA 0.327 -0.857 2.087* -2.258 
 
(1.404) (1.187) (1.264) (1.374) 
Leverage -0.692 0.707 -1.297 1.287 
 
(1.041) (0.966) (1.374) (1.341) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.013*** -0.008** 0.015*** -0.009** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.079 0.163 -0.037 0.127 
 

















 ICR 1.781 -1.360 2.128 -1.781 
 
(1.325) (1.257) (2.649) (2.390) 
CEO_OWN 7.937 -6.916 0.158 0.449 
 
(8.897) (7.751) (9.082) (8.395) 
(CEO_OWN)2 -19.434 15.304 1.206 -4.619 
 
(22.478) (19.281) (19.405) (17.615) 
CEO_Founder 0.304 -0.188 0.323 -0.240 
 
(0.467) (0.444) (0.784) (0.697) 
CEO_Chair 0.121 -0.105 0.111 -0.092 
 
(0.310) (0.257) (0.426) (0.346) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.081 -0.069 0.044 -0.120 
 
(0.444) (0.430) (0.637) (0.610) 
Ln(BoardSize) -2.527*** 2.496*** -3.177*** 3.059*** 
 
(0.566) (0.664) (0.530) (0.592) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -1.675* 1.817** -2.256* 2.318** 
 
(0.890) (0.806) (1.353) (1.171) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) -0.029 0.125 -0.257 0.322 
 
(0.382) (0.372) (0.467) (0.413) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit -3.120 2.597 -2.227 1.785 
 
(2.133) (2.483) (2.970) (2.947) 
Ln(AuditComSize) 0.783 -0.590 0.813 -0.665 
 
(0.517) (0.556) (0.619) (0.597) 
StockVolatilities 5.306 -0.460 4.707 -0.275 
 
(11.678) (9.484) (10.909) (9.581) 
IndustryLitigation 13.515*** -9.327** 10.098* -6.738 
 
(4.592) (4.316) (5.631) (4.991) 
CEO_Tenure -0.024 0.026 -0.039 0.040 
 
(0.023) (0.022) 0.189 -0.191 
Ln(Analyst) -0.073 0.093 (0.280) (0.257) 
 
(0.237) (0.200) -0.698 0.972 
IOC -1.137 1.455 (1.021) (0.938) 
 
(1.147) (1.049) -0.186*** 0.228*** 
StockTurnover -0.199*** 0.245*** (0.060) (0.068) 
 
(0.039) (0.033) 0.189 -0.191 
Constant 5.696** -6.291*** 8.240** -8.649*** 
 
(2.506) (1.945) (3.353) (2.779) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Appendix 1, Panel C: Alternative Specification for Bivariate Probit Model Estimation - Controlling for Firm Organizational 
Changes. 
 This table reports re-estimation results of the bivariate probit model while controlling organizational changes triggered by mergers and 
acquisitions (MA) and divestitures and spinoffs (DS). MAt-1 and DSt-1 are the number of mergers and acquisitions and divestitures and 
spinoffs completed by a firm in the previous year. Other control variables in the fraud and detection regressions are identical to those in 
Table V. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 




  FDA 
  
1.006*** -1.267*** 
   
(0.204) (0.173) 
MAt-1 -0.005 0.028** 0.029 0.017 
 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) 
DSt-1 0.039 -0.018 0.043* 0.036 
 
(0.048) (0.046) (0.025) (0.026) 
Tobin's Q -0.237*** 0.215*** -0.212*** 0.328*** 
 
(0.081) (0.074) (0.044) (0.044) 
Ebitda/TA 0.585 -1.060 0.447 -2.290*** 
 
(1.299) (1.107) (0.369) (0.544) 
Leverage -0.075 0.149 -0.536*** 1.382*** 
 
(0.954) (0.874) (0.186) (0.279) 
SalesGrowth_3Yr 0.013*** -0.007** 0.013*** -0.004** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln(TotalAssets) -0.126* 0.190*** 0.170*** 0.184*** 
 

























 CEO_OWN 6.784 -5.844 2.722 1.718 
 
(8.396) (7.305) (2.756) (2.714) 
(CEO_OWN)2 -18.750 14.670 -7.991 -11.718 
 
(21.448) (18.658) (10.867) (10.422) 
CEO_Founder 0.502 -0.371 0.178 0.124 
 
(0.461) (0.446) (0.135) (0.163) 
CEO_Chair 0.211 -0.187 0.041 -0.119 
 
(0.288) (0.246) (0.154) (0.122) 
Ln(CEO_Age) -0.058 -0.076 -0.494*** 0.199 
 
(0.440) (0.433) (0.162) (0.176) 
Ln(BoardSize) -2.419*** 2.356*** -0.944*** 2.175*** 
 
(0.546) (0.535) (0.251) (0.278) 
%_NonIndepDirectors -1.854** 1.941*** -0.456 1.644*** 
 
(0.748) (0.694) (0.426) (0.474) 
Ln(BoardMeetings) -0.080 0.156 0.299** 0.016 
 
(0.348) (0.326) (0.138) (0.118) 
%_NonIndepDirectors_Audit -2.604 2.119 -1.153 0.449 
 
(2.053) (2.253) (0.858) (0.956) 
Ln(AuditComSize) 0.651 -0.477 0.865*** -1.145*** 
 
(0.424) (0.431) (0.209) (0.220) 
StockVolatilities 8.223 -3.525 19.410*** -7.030* 
 
(11.833) (9.454) (4.841) (3.766) 
IndustryLitigation 12.403*** -8.449** 3.320** 2.055* 
 
(3.790) (3.371) (1.314) (1.057) 
CEO_Tenure -0.036 0.036 -0.012 0.025*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.009) (0.009) 
Ln(Analyst) -0.138 0.131 0.033 -0.032 
 
(0.227) (0.193) (0.080) (0.092) 
IOC -1.052 1.351 0.334 1.067** 
 
(1.182) (1.094) (0.447) (0.475) 
StockTurnover -0.200*** 0.242*** 0.021 0.197*** 
 
(0.042) (0.038) (0.031) (0.034) 
Constant 6.015*** -6.302*** -0.827 -7.733*** 
 
(2.022) (1.752) (0.903) (1.153) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Appendix 1, Panel D: Alternative Specification for Bivariate Probit Model Estimation - Alternative Clustering Standard Errors. 
 
This table reports re-estimation results of the bivariate probit model while clustering standard errors at different levels. Columns (1)-(4) and Columns (5)-(8) 
cluster standard errors at the firm- and CEO-firm pair level. Fraud incidence and detection regression specifications are identical to those in Table V. Control 
variables are not reported. All regressions include year dummies. Coefficients marked with *, ** and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Cluster by Firms Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Cluster by 
CEO-Firm Pair N N N N Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 





Appendix 2: Abnormal Measures of Appointment-based CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using abnormal measures of appointment-based CEO connectedness. AFTA, the abnormal fraction of top 
four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, is the residual of the regression in Column (1) of Panel A. AFDA, the abnormal fraction 
of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, the residual of the regression in Column (2) of Panel A. AFTA+AFDA is the sum of AFTA and 
AFDA divided by 2. The unreported control variables in Panels B-E are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. Definitions of all 
variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in Panels B, D, and E, and at the firm level 
in Panel A and C. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Regressions to Construct AFTA and AFDA. 
 
FTA FDA 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
CEO Tenure 0.051*** 0.065*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) 
CEO_Tenure2 -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 





























 Constant 0.579*** 0.338*** 
 
(0.009) (0.006) 
Year FE Y Y 
Observations 21599 11,063 
Adjusted R-squared 0.24 0.76 
 
Panel B: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (4) (5) (7) (8) 
AFTA 1.090*** -0.989*** 
    
 
(0.400) (0.364) 




   
(0.689) (0.646) 
  AFTA+AFDA 
    
1.297** -1.185** 
     
(0.506) (0.461) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1255 -1255 -1102 -1102 -1101 -1101 
 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 






















































Fraud t-3-t 0.059*** 0.013 0.030 0.639 -0.141 0.033 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.532) (0.445) (0.524) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y N N N 
Observations 8,265 6,546 6,546 1,325 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.111 0.109 0.128 
   Wald       314.9 283.9 352.6 
 
Panel D: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration)  _t 




























Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 228 228 296 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.283 0.289 0.286 
   Wald       20261 11234 13331 
 
Panel E: The Number of People Charged 
 
Ln(Num_Charged+1) 














   
(0.248) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 308 234 234 





Appendix 3: Tenure Weighted Appointment-based CEO Connectedness Variables and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using CEO connectedness measures weighted by the executives’ tenure and directors’ tenure. FTA_WT is the fraction of 
top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ tenure. AFTA_WT is the abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO 
executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ tenure. FDA_WT is the fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, 
weighted by the directors’ tenure. AFDA_WT is abnormal fraction of directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the directors’ tenure. The unreported 
control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in Panels A, C and D and at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 
10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FTA_WT 0.554*** -1.061*** 
      
 
(0.153) (0.158) 
      AFTA_WT 
  
0.418** -1.202*** 
    
   
(0.170) (0.227) 
    FDA_WT 
    
1.299*** -1.117*** 
  
     
(0.386) (0.219) 
  AFDA_WT 
      
1.054** -0.998** 
       
(0.523) (0.475) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1253 -1253 -1254 -1254 -1106 -1106 -1102 -1102 
 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraud t-3-t*FTA_WT -0.195*** 
   
-2.688** 
   
 
(0.058) 
   
(1.356) 
   FTA_WT -0.086*** 
   
-2.057*** 
   
 
(0.015) 
   
(0.568) 
   Fraud t-3-t*AFTA_WT 
 
-0.272*** 





   
(1.756) 
  AFTA_WT 
 
-0.086*** 





   
(0.589) 
  Fraud t-3-t*FDA_WT 
  
-0.206*** 
   
-39.541** 
 
   
(0.075) 





   
-1.972 
 
   
(0.027) 
   
(2.964) 
 Fraud t-3-t*AFDA_WT 
   
-0.030 
   
-6.274 
    
(0.151) 
   
(7.190) 
AFDA_WT 
   
0.033 
   
-0.611 
    
(0.034) 
   
(2.456) 
Fraud t-3-t 0.120*** 0.054** 0.050* 0.018 1.493** 0.643 0.997* 0.096 
 
(0.037) (0.021) (0.030) (0.022) (0.683) (0.534) (0.583) (0.443) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Observations 8,265 8,265 6,546 6,546 1,325 1,325 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.108 0.109 0.106 
    Wald . . . . 326.3 315.4 256.2 283.5 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration) _t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FTA_WT 0.367** 
   
-0.820*** 
   
 
(0.174) 
   
(0.229) 
   AFTA_WT 
 
0.334* 





   
(0.254) 
  FDA_WT 
  
0.619** 
   
-1.003** 
 
   
(0.277) 
   
(0.399) 
 AFDA_WT 
   
0.977*** 
   
-1.242** 
    
(0.345) 
   
(0.535) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 296 228 228 296 296 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.287 0.287 0.295 
    Wald         19084 18227 40421 54708 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
 
Ln(Num_Charged+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FTA_WT 0.154* 
   
 
(0.077) 










   
(0.153) 
 AFDA_WT 
   
0.086 
    
(0.295) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 308 308 234 234 





Appendix 4: Compensation Weighted Appointment-based CEO Connectedness Variables and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using CEO connectedness measures weighted by the executives’ compensation. FTA_WC 
is the fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ compensation. 
AFTA_WC is the abnormal fraction of top four non-CEO executives appointed during the current CEO’s tenure, weighted by the executives’ 
compensation. The unreported control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. Definitions 
of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in Panel A, C, and D 
and at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 




  AFTA_WC 
  
1.221*** -1.059*** 
   
(0.403) (0.386) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1253 -1253 -1254 -1254 
 
 








































Fraud_t-3-t 0.134*** 0.057*** 1.611** 0.683 
 
(0.039) (0.021) (0.748) (0.548) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y N N 
Observations 8,265 8,265 1,325 1,325 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.110 
  Wald . . 323.5 312.4 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
 
Ln(Duration) _t 


















Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 296 296 296 
Adjusted R2 0.285 0.282 
  Wald     52927 54584 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
 
Ln(Num_Charged+1) 










Industry Dummies Y Y 
Observations 308 308 





Appendix 5: Appointment-based CEO Connectedness with Independent Directors and Non-independent Directors and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using fractions of independent and non-independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. FIDA is 
the fraction of independent directors appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. AFIDA is the abnormal FIDA. FNIDA is the fraction of non-independent directors 
appointed during the current CEO’s tenure. AFNIDA is the abnormal FNIDA. The unreported control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, 
VIII, and IX, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in 
Panels A, C and D and clustered at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FIDA 0.687 -0.496 
      
 
(0.426) (0.329) 
      AFIDA 
  
0.982** -0.799** 
    
   
(0.389) (0.374) 
    FNIDA 
    
1.190** -1.055** 
  
     
(0.524) (0.496) 
  AFNIDA
      
1.246** -1.097* 
       
(0.608) (0.589) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,246 6,246 6,246 6,246 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1102 -1102 -1107 -1107 -1101 -1101 -1102 -1102 
 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraud t-3-t*FIDA -0.134*** 
   
-0.791 
   
 
(0.049) 
   
(3.054) 
   FIDA -0.091*** 
   
-3.401** 
   
 
(0.020) 
   
(1.419) 
   Fraud t-3-t*AFIDA 
 
-0.120 





   
(3.110) 
  AFIDA 
 
-0.072** 





   
(1.373) 
  Fraud t-3-t*FNIDA 
  
-0.090** 
   
-3.067 
 
   
(0.043) 





   
0.336 
 
   
(0.020) 
   
(1.293) 
 Fraud t-3-t*AFNIDA 
   
-0.040 
   
-4.463* 
    
(0.076) 
   
(2.694) 
AFNIDA 
   
-0.010 
   
0.337 
    
(0.024) 
   
(1.197) 
Fraud t-3-t 0.068** 0.018 0.038 0.021 0.299 0.170 0.510 0.327 
 
(0.033) (0.019) (0.025) (0.020) (0.437) (0.450) (0.448) (0.410) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Observations 6,532 6,532 6,541 6,541 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.117 0.109 0.107 0.106 
    Wald . . . . 302.0 294.6 261.3 285.9 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration) _t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FIDA 0.344* 
   
-0.403 
   
 
(0.201) 
   
(0.260) 
   AFIDA 
 
0.690** 





   
(0.286) 
  FNIDA 
  
0.452 
   
-1.229** 
 
   
(0.334) 
   
(0.498) 
 AFNIDA 
   
0.475 
   
-1.084* 
    
(0.346) 
   
(0.625) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 228 
Adjusted R2 0.277 0.287 0.282 0.278 
    Wald         22830 10367 4410 27189 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
 
Ln(Num_Charged+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
FIDA 0.418* 
   
 
(0.215) 










   
(0.139) 
 AFNIDA 
   
0.169 
    
(0.143) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 234 234 234 234 








Appendix 6: Appointment-based CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud – Fraud Sample Including Fraud Cases in which the CEO is Not a 
Named Respondent. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX based on the sample including both CEO-named and CEO-not-named fraud cases. The unreported 
control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. 
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in Panels A, C, and D and at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients 
marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
  Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
FTA 0.783* -0.896** 
    
 
(0.473) (0.446) 




   
(0.212) (0.145) 
  FTA+FDA 
    
1.428*** -1.411*** 
     
(0.542) (0.484) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 6,250 6,250 6,250 6,250 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1475 -1475 -1296 -1296 -1297 -1297 
 
Panel B: Forced CEO Turnover-Fraud Sensitivity 
 Forced_CEO_Turnover 
  OLS   Clogit  
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Fraud_t-3-t*FTA -0.188***   -2.692**   
 (0.053)   (1.238)   
FTA -0.090***   -2.084***   
 (0.015)   (0.520)   
Fraud_t-3-t*FDA  -0.171***   -1.638  
  (0.058)   (4.297)  
FDA  -0.105***   -3.520*  
  (0.026)   (1.799)  
Fraud_t-3-t*(FTA+FDA)   -0.222***   -3.654 
   (0.072)   (2.452) 
FTA+FDA   -0.164***   -4.701*** 
   (0.028)   (1.189) 
Fraud_t-3-t 0.126*** 0.073** 0.112*** 1.597** 0.317 1.235* 
 (0.037) (0.033) (0.042) (0.621) (0.492) (0.726) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y N N N 
Observations 8,265 6,546 6,546 1,325 1,001 1,001 
Adjusted R2 0.114 0.116 0.131    
Wald       364.0 300.6 334.2 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration_Day)  _t 




























Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 352 271 271 352 271 271 
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.264 0.270 
   Wald       60514 40070 54684 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
 
Ln(Num_Charged+1) 














   
(0.260) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 366 278 278 





Appendix 7: Pre-existing Network Ties between the CEO and Top Executives and Corporate Fraud. 
. 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using pre-existing network ties between the CEO and top 4 non-CEO executives as the measure of CEO connectedness. 
Exe_Tie_Emp is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with top 4 non-CEO executives through past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the 
board) divided by four. Exe_Tie_Edu is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with top 4 non-CEO executives through past educational institutions divided by four. 
Exe_Tie_Soc is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with top 4 non-CEO executives through past membership to social and professional organizations divided 
four. Exe_Tie is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with top 4 non-CEO executives through past employment, educational institutions, and past membership to 
social and professional organizations divided by four. Only network ties established during overlapping years are included. The unreported control variables in Panels A-D are the 
same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and XI, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the 
industry level in Panels A, C and D and at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exe_Tie -0.108 0.022 
      
 
(0.098) (0.098) 
      Exe_Tie_Emp 
  
-0.142 0.041 
    
   
(0.099) (0.106) 
    Exe Tie Edu
    
-0.522 3.172*** 
  
     
(0.715) (0.692) 
  Exe Tie Soc 
      
5.888 -3.749 
       
(4.385) (2.723) 
Pct_Known_Exe_Tie -0.803*** 0.187 -0.771*** 0.171 -0.693*** -0.006 -0.653 0.378 
 
(0.247) (0.285) (0.246) (0.296) (0.240) (0.241) (0.418) (0.385) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1259 -1259 -1259 -1259 -1258 -1258 -1254 -1254 
 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraud t-3-t*Exe_Tie 0.060 
   
0.539 
   
 
(0.040) 
   
(0.366) 
   Exe Tie -0.015 
   
0.020 
   
 
(0.014) 
   
(0.498) 
   Fraud t-3-t*Exe_Tie_Emp 
 
0.061 





   
(0.375) 
  Exe_Tie_Emp 
 
-0.016 





   
(0.532) 
  Fraud t-3-t*Exe_Tie_Edu 
  
-0.223 
   
-8.357* 
 
   
(0.187) 





   
2.293 
 
   
(0.048) 
   
(3.128) 
 Fraud t-3-t*Exe Tie Soc 
   
1.094 
   
527.749 
    
(1.244) 
   
(0.000) 
Exe Tie Soc 
   
0.021 
   
527.749 
    
(0.047) 
   
(0.000) 
Fraud t-3-t 0.011 0.012 0.035* 0.030 0.364 0.370 0.757 0.602 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.523) (0.516) (0.486) (0.464) 
Pct Known Exe Tie 0.009 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.644 0.652 0.733 0.727 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.690) (0.692) (0.659) (0.661) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Observations 8,265 8,265 8,265 8,265 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.090 0.089 0.090 
    Wald . . . . 298.4 298.4 284.0 121.7 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration) _t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Exe_Tie -0.159 
   
0.112 
   
 
(0.113) 
   
(0.129) 
   Exe Tie Emp 
 
-0.148 





   
(0.137) 
  Exe Tie Edu 
  
-0.704 
   
-0.247 
 
   
(1.166) 
   
(1.111) 
 Exe_Tie_Soc 
   
-4.533 
   
6.649 
    
(6.572) 
   
(8.180) 
Pct Known Exe Tie 0.347*** 0.343*** 0.325*** 0.321*** -0.565*** -0.565*** -0.544*** -0.551*** 
 
(0.109) (0.109) (0.108) (0.116) (0.182) (0.182) (0.184) (0.187) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.290 0.286 0.288 
    Wald         20836 20715 44146 30157 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
  Ln(Num_Charged+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Exe Tie 0.021 
   
 
(0.065) 










   
(0.966) 
 Exe_Tie_Soc 
   
0.729 
    
(1.082) 
Pct_Known_Exe_Tie 0.102 0.103 0.105 0.107 
 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.153) (0.152) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 308 308 308 308 








Appendix 8: Pre-existing Network Ties between the CEO and Directors and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using pre-existing network ties between the CEO and directors as the measure of CEO connectedness. Dir_Tie_Emp is the 
total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past employment (either working as an employee or serving on the board) divided by the number of 
directors on the board. Dir_Tie_Edu is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past educational institutions divided by the number of 
directors on the board. Dir_Tie_Soc is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past membership to social and professional organizations 
divided by the number of directors on the board. Dir_Tie is the total number of pre-existing network ties a CEO has with directors through past employment, educational 
institutions, and past membership to social and professional organizations divided by the number of directors on the board. Only network ties established during overlapping 
years are included. The unreported control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and XI, respectively. Definitions of all variables are provided in 
Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at the industry level in Panels A, C and D and at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, 
and *** are significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dir Tie -0.413 0.215 
      
 
(0.975) (0.813) 
      Dir Tie Emp 
  
-0.635*** 0.111 
    
   
(0.149) (0.195) 
    Dir_Tie_Edu 
    
-2.484*** 0.764 
  
     
(0.792) (1.171) 
  Dir_Tie_Soc
      
2.641*** -0.966 
       
(0.803) (0.768) 
Pct_Known_Dir_Tie 8.761* -7.931 -0.991 -6.342*** 0.009 -6.243*** 9.594*** -9.162*** 
 
(4.626) (4.972) (0.917) (1.020) (0.965) (1.027) (2.608) (2.374) 
Year Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 7,871 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1252 -1252 -1252 -1252 -1258 -1258 -1242 -1242 
 





VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraud t-3-t*Dir_Tie 0.006 
   
-1.304 
   
 
(0.070) 
   
(1.075) 
   Dir Tie -0.033 
   
-0.786 
   
 
(0.021) 
   
(0.794) 
   Fraud t-3-t*Dir Tie Emp 
 
0.006 





   
(1.268) 
  Dir_Tie_Emp 
 
-0.009 





   
(1.035) 
  Fraud t-3-t*Dir Tie Edu 
  
-0.211 
   
-12.932* 
 
   
(0.585) 





   
-1.699 
 
   
(0.112) 
   
(2.865) 
 Fraud t-3-t*Dir_Tie_Soc 
   
0.144 
   
-3.495 
    
(0.286) 
   
(5.183) 
Dir_Tie_Soc 
   
-0.285** 
   
-3.625 
    
(0.138) 
   
(2.820) 
Fraud t-3-t 0.028 0.029 0.052 0.016 1.410* 0.999 1.964** 0.985 
 
(0.049) (0.036) (0.062) (0.037) (0.846) (0.694) (0.870) (0.732) 
Pct_Known_Dir_Tie 0.021 -0.001 0.025 0.022 0.791 0.498 0.355 0.548 
 
(0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.038) (0.996) (0.962) (0.858) (0.841) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm FE Y Y Y Y N N N N 
Observations 8,265 8,265 8,265 8,265 1,325 1,325 1,325 1,325 
Adjusted R2 0.090 0.089 0.092 0.091 
    Wald . . . . 314.4 317.4 312.9 318.0 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
  Ln(Duration) _t 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Dir Tie 0.234 
   
-0.914* 
   
 
(0.294) 
   
(0.507) 
   Dir_Tie_Emp 
 
0.253 





   
(0.561) 
  Dir_Tie_Edu 
  
1.831 
   
-4.494** 
 
   
(1.858) 
   
(1.969) 
 Dir_Tie_Soc 
   
-0.474 
   
0.260 
    
(1.356) 
   
(1.523) 
Pct_Known_Dir_Tie -0.072 -0.021 -0.148 0.138 0.400 0.210 0.355 -0.228 
 
(0.240) (0.178) (0.313) (0.203) (0.435) (0.328) (0.406) (0.281) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 296 
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.280 0.282 0.277 
    Wald         8885 25789 18075 46829 
 
Panel D: The Number of People Charged 
  Ln(Num_Charged+1) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dir_Tie -0.027 
   
 
(0.165) 










   
(0.856) 
 Dir_Tie_Soc 
   
-0.878 
    
(0.592) 
Pct_Known_Dir_Tie -0.035 -0.070 0.086 0.047 
 
(0.169) (0.151) (0.134) (0.129) 
Industry Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 308 308 308 308 





Appendix 9: CEO Power and Corporate Fraud. 
 
This table re-estimates Tables V, VII, VIII, and IX using the CEO power index. CEO_Power is the sum of CEO_Founder, 
CEO_Chair, H_CEO_OWN, and L_CEO_Tenure. H_CEO_OWN is equal to one if the CEO owns 10% or more share 
outstanding, and zero otherwise. L_CEO_Tenure is equal to one if the CEO’s current tenure is longer than four years (sample 
median), and zero otherwise. The unreported control variables in Panels A-D are the same as those in Tables V, VII, VIII, and 
XI, respectively, except that CEO_Founder, CEO_Chair, CEO_OWN, and CEO_Tenure are dropped from the control 
variables. Definitions of all variables are provided in Table I. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are clustered at 
the industry level in Panels A, C, and D and clustered at the firm level in Panel B. Coefficients marked with *, **, and *** are 
significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bivariate Probit Model Estimation of Corporate Fraud 
 
Fraud Detect|Fraud 
VARIABLES  (1) (2) 
CEO_Power 0.155 -0.100 
 
(0.138) (0.116) 
Year Dummies Y Y 
Observations 7,871 7,871 
Prob> Chi2 0.000 0.000 
log likelihood -1266 -1266 
 






Fraud_t-3-t*CEO_Power -0.029 0.217 
 
(0.018) (0.649) 
CEO_Power -0.018*** -0.932*** 
 
(0.005) (0.195) 
Fraud t-3-t 0.069* 0.242 
 
(0.036) (0.775) 
Year FE (Dummies) Y Y 
Firm FE Y N 
Observations 7,978 1,214 
Adjusted R2 0.082 
 Wald   488.9 
 
Panel C: Fraud Detection Duration 
VARIABLES  Ln(Duration_Day)  _t 
 
(1) (2) 
CEO_Power 0.087* -0.248*** 
 
(0.049) (0.063) 
Industry Dummies Y Y 
Observations 296 296 
Adjusted R2 0.284 
 Wald   68208 
 







Industry Dummies Y 
Observations 303 
Adjusted R2 0.100 
 
